CACI No. 1244. Affirmative Defense - Sophisticated User
Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2023 edition)
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1244.Affirmative Defense - Sophisticated User
[Name of defendant] claims that [he/she/nonbinary pronoun/it] is not
responsible for any harm to [name of plaintiff] based on a failure to warn
because [name of plaintiff] is a sophisticated user of the [product]. To
succeed on this defense, [name of defendant] must prove that, at the time
of the injury, [name of plaintiff], because of [his/her/nonbinary pronoun]
particular position, training, experience, knowledge, or skill, knew or
should have known of the [product]’s risk, harm, or danger.
New October 2008; Revised December 2014
Directions for Use
Give this instruction as a defense to CACI No. 1205, Strict Liability - Failure to
Warn - Essential Factual Elements, or CACI No. 1222, Negligence - Manufacturer
or Supplier - Duty to Warn - Essential Factual Elements.
In some cases, it may be necessary to expand this instruction to state that the
plaintiff knew or should have known of the particular risk posed by the product, of
the severity of the potential consequences, and how to use the product to reduce or
avoid the risks, to the extent that information was known to the defendant. (See
Buckner v. Milwaukee Electric Tool Corp. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 522, 536 [166
Cal.Rptr.3d 202].)
Sources and Authority
• “A manufacturer is not liable to a sophisticated user of its product for failure to
warn of a risk, harm, or danger, if the sophisticated user knew or should have
known of that risk, harm, or danger.” (Johnson v. American Standard, Inc.
(2008) 43 Cal.4th 56, 71 [74 Cal.Rptr.3d 108, 179 P.3d 905].)
• “The sophisticated user defense exempts manufacturers from their typical
obligation to provide product users with warnings about the products’ potential
hazards. The defense is considered an exception to the manufacturer’s general
duty to warn consumers, and therefore, in most jurisdictions, if successfully
argued, acts as an affirmative defense to negate the manufacturer’s duty to
warn.” (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 65, internal citation omitted.)
• “Under the sophisticated user defense, sophisticated users need not be warned
about dangers of which they are already aware or should be aware. Because
these sophisticated users are charged with knowing the particular product’s
dangers, the failure to warn about those dangers is not the legal cause of any
harm that product may cause. The rationale supporting the defense is that ‘the
failure to provide warnings about risks already known to a sophisticated
purchaser usually is not a proximate cause of harm resulting from those risks
suffered by the buyer’s employees or downstream purchasers.’ This is because
the user’s knowledge of the dangers is the equivalent of prior notice.” (Johnson,
794
supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 65, internal citations omitted.)
• “[T]he defense applies equally to strict liability and negligent failure to warn
cases. The duty to warn is measured by what is generally known or should have
been known to the class of sophisticated users, rather than by the individual
plaintiff’s subjective knowledge.” (Johnson, supra, 43 Cal.4th at pp. 65-66,
internal citations omitted.)
• “[A] manufacturer is not liable to a sophisticated user for failure to warn, even if
the failure to warn is a failure to provide a warning required by statute.”
(Johnson v. Honeywell Internat. Inc. (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 549, 556 [101
Cal.Rptr.3d 726].)
• “The sophisticated user defense concerns warnings. Sophisticated users ‘are
charged with knowing the particular product’s dangers.’ ‘The rationale
supporting the defense is that “the failure to provide warnings about risks
already known to a sophisticated purchaser usually is not a proximate cause of
harm resulting from those risks suffered by the buyer’s employees or
downstream purchasers.” [Citation.]’ [¶] [Plaintiff]’s design defect cause of
action was not concerned with warnings. Instead, he alleged that respondents’
design of their refrigerant was defective. We see no logical reason why a defense
that is based on the need for warning should apply.” (Johnson, supra, 179
Cal.App.4th at p. 559, internal citations omitted.)
• “The relevant time for determining user sophistication for purposes of this
exception to a manufacturer’s duty to warn is when the sophisticated user is
injured and knew or should have known of the risk.” (Johnson, supra, 43
Cal.4th at p. 73.)
• “Johnson did not impute an intermediary’s knowledge to the plaintiff, or charge
him with any knowledge except that which had been made available to him
through his training and which, by reason of his profession and certification, he
should have had. In contrast, [defendant]’s proposed instruction is not based on
the theory that [plaintiff] had the opportunity to acquire any knowledge of the
dangers of asbestos, let alone the obligation to do so. Instead, it contends that its
customers . . . knew or should have known (from public sources) of the dangers
of asbestos, and that its duty to warn [plaintiff] is measured by the knowledge
[the customers] should have had. It is apparent that such a theory has nothing to
do with Johnson.” (Stewart v. Union Carbide Corp. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 23,
28-29 [117 Cal.Rptr.3d 791].)
• “Thus, in actions by employees or servants, the critical issue concerns their
knowledge (or potential knowledge), rather than an intermediary’s sophistication.
[¶] This conclusion flows directly from [Restatement Third of Torts] section 388
itself. Under section 388, a supplier of a dangerous item to users ‘directly or
through a third person’ is subject to liability for a failure to warn, when the
supplier ‘has no reason to believe that those for whose use the [item] is supplied
will realize its dangerous condition.’ Accordingly, to avoid liability, there must
be some basis for the supplier to believe that the ultimate user knows, or should
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know, of the item’s hazards. In view of this requirement, the intermediary’s
sophistication is not, as matter of law, sufficient to avert liability; there must be a
sufficient reason for believing that the intermediary’s sophistication is likely to
operate to protect the user, or that the user is likely to discover the hazards in
some other manner. The fact that the user is an employee or servant of the
sophisticated intermediary cannot plausibly be regarded as a sufficient reason, as
a matter of law, to infer that the latter will protect the former. We therefore
reject [defendant]’s contention that an intermediary’s sophistication invariably
shields suppliers from liability to the intermediary’s employees or servants.”
(Pfeifer v. John Crane, Inc. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 1270, 1296-1297 [164
Cal.Rptr.3d 112].)
• “In order to establish the defense, a manufacturer must demonstrate that
sophisticated users of the product know what the risks are, including the degree
of danger involved (i.e., the severity of the potential injury), and how to use the
product to reduce or avoid the risks, to the extent that information is known to
the manufacturer.” (Buckner, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 536.)
• “ ‘Under the “should have known” standard there will be some users who were
actually unaware of the dangers. However, the same could be said of the
currently accepted obvious danger rule; obvious dangers are obvious to most, but
are not obvious to absolutely everyone. The obvious danger rule is an objective
test, and the courts do not inquire into the user’s subjective knowledge in such a
case. In other words, even if a user was truly unaware of a product’s hazards,
that fact is irrelevant if the danger was objectively obvious. [Citations.] Thus,
under the sophisticated user defense, the inquiry focuses on whether the plaintiff
knew, or should have known, of the particular risk of harm from the product
giving rise to the injury.’ [Citation]” (Moran v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp.
(2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 500, 511 [200 Cal.Rptr.3d 902].)
• “[S]peculation about a risk does not give rise to constructive knowledge of a risk
under the ‘should have known’ test.” (Scott v. Ford Motor Co. (2014) 224
Cal.App.4th 1492, 1501 [169 Cal.Rptr.3d 823], original italics.)
Secondary Sources
6 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts, §§ 1631, 1703,
1708-1709
Haning et al., California Practice Guide: Personal Injury, Ch. 2(II)-D, Strict Liability
For Defective Products, ¶ 2:1277 (The Rutter Group)
40 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 460, Products Liability, § 460.185
(Matthew Bender)
19 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 190, Products Liability, § 190.246
(Matthew Bender)
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© Judicial Council of California.
