California Criminal Jury Instructions (CALCRIM) (2017)
1030. Sodomy by Force, Fear, or ThreatsDownload PDF
1030.Sodomy by Force, Fear, or Threats (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2),
The defendant is charged [in Count ] with sodomy by force [in
violation of Penal Code section 286].
To prove that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must
1. The defendant committed an act of sodomy with another person;
2. The other person did not consent to the act;
3. The defendant accomplished the act:
<Alternative 3A—force or fear>
[by force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and
unlawful bodily injury to another person.]
<Alternative 3B—future threats of bodily harm>
[by threatening to retaliate against someone when there was a
reasonable possibility that the defendant would carry out the threat.
Athreat to retaliate is a threat to kidnap, unlawfully restrain or
conﬁne, or inﬂict extreme pain, serious bodily injury, or death.]
<Alternative 3C—threat of offıcial action>
[by threatening to use the authority of a public office to incarcerate,
arrest, or deport someone. A public official is a person employed by a
government agency who has authority to incarcerate, arrest, or
deport. The other person must have reasonably believed that the
defendant was a public official even if (he/she) was not.]
Sodomy is any penetration, no matter how slight, of the anus of one
person by the penis of another person. [Ejaculation is not required.]
[In order to consent, a person must act freely and voluntarily and know
the nature of the act.]
[Evidence that the defendant and the other person (dated/were married/
had been married) is not enough by itself to constitute consent.]
[Evidence that the other person (requested/suggested/communicated)
that the defendant use a condom or other birth control device is not
enough by itself to constitute consent.]
[An act is accomplished by force if a person uses enough physical force
to overcome the other person’s will.]
[Duress means a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger,
hardship, or retribution that causes a reasonable person to do [or
submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit
to]. When deciding whether the act was accomplished by duress,
consider all the circumstances, including the age of the other person and
(his/her) relationship to the defendant.]
[Retribution is a form of payback or revenge.]
[Menace means a threat, statement, or act showing an intent to injure
[An act is accomplished by fear if the other person is actually and
reasonably afraid [or he or she is actually but unreasonably afraid and
the defendant knows of his or her fear and takes advantage of it].]
[The other person must be alive at the time of the act for the crime of
sodomy to occur.]
<Defense: Reasonable Belief in Consent>
[The defendant is not guilty of forcible sodomy if (he/she) actually and
reasonably believed that the other person consented to the act. The
People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not actually and reasonably believe that the other person
consented. If the People have not met this burden, you must ﬁnd the
defendant not guilty.]
New January 2006; Revised August 2006, February 2012
The court has a sua sponte duty to give an instruction deﬁning the elements of
sodomy. (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k); People v. Martinez (1986) 188
Cal.App.3d 19, 24–26 [232 Cal.Rptr. 736]; People v. Moore (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d
1400, 1407 [260 Cal.Rptr. 134].)
The court should select the appropriate alternative in element 3 to instruct how the
sodomy was accomplished.
Sodomy requires that the victim be alive at the moment of the act. (People v.
Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1175–1177 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965]; If
this is an issue in the case, give the bracketed sentence that begins with “The other
person must be alive . . .”
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the defense of reasonable belief in
consent if there is “substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a
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defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not.”
(See People v. Williams (1992) 4 Cal.4th 354, 362 [14 Cal.Rptr.2d 441, 841 P.2d
961]; People v. Mayberry (1975) 15 Cal.3d 143, 153–158 [125 Cal.Rptr. 745, 542
• Elements. Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k).
•Consent Deﬁned. Pen. Code, §§ 261.6, 261.7.
• Duress Deﬁned. People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16
Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071]; People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 50
[216 Cal.Rptr. 221].
• Menace Deﬁned. Pen. Code, § 261(c) [in context of rape].
• Sodomy Deﬁned. Pen. Code, § 286(a); see People v. Singh (1923) 62 Cal.App.
450, 452 [217 P. 121] [ejaculation is not required].
• Threatening to Retaliate Deﬁned. Pen. Code, § 286(l).
• Fear Deﬁned. People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 810 [200 Cal.Rptr.
651]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856 [30 Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d
1183] [in context of rape].
• Force Deﬁned. People v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16
Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d 1089]; see also People v. Guido (2005) 125
Cal.App.4th 566, 574 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826].
2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Sex Offenses and
Crimes Against Decency, §§ 25, 26, 28.
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 142,
Crimes Against the Person, § 142.20[b],  (Matthew Bender).
Couzens & Bigelow, Sex Crimes: California Law and Procedure §§ 12:16, 12:17
(The Rutter Group).
Penal Code section 286 requires that the sodomy be “against the will” of the other
person. (Pen. Code, § 286(c)(2), (3), (k).) “Against the will” has been deﬁned as
“without consent.” (People v. Key (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 888, 895 [203 Cal.Rptr.
144] [in context of rape]; see also People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248, 257
[235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)
The instruction includes a deﬁnition of the sufficiency of “fear” because that term
has meaning in the context of forcible sodomy that is technical and may not be
readily apparent to jurors. (See People v. Reyes (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 803, 810
[200 Cal.Rptr. 651] [fear]; People v. Iniguez (1994) 7 Cal.4th 847, 856–857 [30
Cal.Rptr.2d 258, 872 P.2d 1183] [fear in context of rape].)
The court is not required to instruct sua sponte on the deﬁnition of “duress” or
“menace” and Penal Code section 286 does not deﬁne either term. (People v.
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Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 38, 52 [216 Cal.Rptr. 221] [duress]). Optional
deﬁnitions are provided for the court to use at its discretion. The deﬁnition of
“duress” is based on People v. Leal (2004) 33 Cal.4th 999, 1004–1010 [16
Cal.Rptr.3d 869, 94 P.3d 1071], and People v. Pitmon,supra, 170 Cal.App.3d at
50. The deﬁnition of “menace” is based on the statutory deﬁnitions contained in
Penal Code sections 261 and 262 [rape]. (See People v. Cochran (2002) 103
Cal.App.4th 8, 13–14 [126 Cal.Rptr.2d 416] [using rape deﬁnition in case involving
forcible lewd acts].) In People v. Leal, supra, 33 Cal.4th at pp. 1004–1010, the
court held that the statutory deﬁnition of “duress” contained in Penal Code sections
261 and 262 does not apply to the use of that term in any other statute. The court
did not discuss the statutory deﬁnition of “menace.” The court should consider the
Leal opinion before giving the deﬁnition of “menace.”
The term “force” as used in the forcible sex offense statutes does not have a
specialized meaning and court is not required to deﬁne the term sua sponte.
(People v. Griffın (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1023–1024 [16 Cal.Rptr.3d 891, 94 P.3d
1089].) In People v. Griffın, supra, the Supreme Court further stated,
Nor is there anything in the common usage deﬁnitions of the term “force,” or
in the express statutory language of section 261 itself, that suggests force in a
forcible rape prosecution actually means force “substantially different from or
substantially greater than” the physical force normally inherent in an act of
consensual sexual intercourse. (People v. Cicero (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 465,
474 [204 Cal.Rptr. 582].) To the contrary, it has long been recognized that “in
order to establish force within the meaning of section 261, [former] subdivision
(2), the prosecution need only show the defendant used physical force of a
degree sufficient to support a ﬁnding that the act of sexual intercourse was
against the will of the [victim].” (People v. Young (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 248,
257–258 [235 Cal.Rptr. 361].)
(Ibid. [emphasis in original]; see also People v. Guido (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 566,
574 [22 Cal.Rptr.3d 826].)
The committee has provided a bracketed deﬁnition of “force,” consistent with
People v. Griffın, supra, that the court may give on request.
LESSER INCLUDED OFFENSES
• Assault. Pen. Code, § 240.
•Assault With Intent to Commit Sodomy. Pen. Code, § 220; see In re Jose M.
(1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 1470, 1477 [27 Cal.Rptr.2d 55] [in context of rape];
People v. Moran (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 724, 730 [109 Cal.Rptr. 287] [where
forcible crime is charged].
• Attempted Forcible Sodomy. Pen. Code, §§ 664, 286.
• Battery. Pen. Code, § 242; People v. Hughes (2002) 27 Cal.4th 287, 366 [116
Cal.Rptr.2d 401, 39 P.3d 432].
Non-forcible sex crimes requiring the perpetrator and victim to be within certain
age limits are not lesser included offenses of forcible sex crimes. (People v. Scott
CALCRIM No. 1030 SEX OFFENSES
(2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 784, 794 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 70].)
Consent Obtained by Fraudulent Representation
Aperson may also induce someone else to consent to engage in sodomy by a false
or fraudulent representation made with an intent to create fear, and which does
induce fear and would cause a reasonable person to act contrary to his or her free
will. (Pen. Code, § 266c.) While section 266c requires coercion and fear to obtain
consent, it does not involve physical force or violence. (See People v. Cardenas
(1994) 21 Cal.App.4th 927, 937–938 [26 Cal.Rptr.2d 567] [rejecting defendant’s
argument that certain acts were consensual and without physical force, and were
only violations of section 266c].)
A forcible rape occurs when, during apparently consensual intercourse, the victim
expresses an objection and attempts to stop the act and the defendant forcibly
continues despite the objection. (In re John Z. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 756, 760 [128
Cal.Rptr.2d 783, 60 P.3d 183].) If there is an issue whether consent to sodomy was
withdrawn, see CALCRIM No. 1000, Rape or Spousal Rape by Force, Fear, or
Threats, for language that may be adapted for use in this instruction.
Victim Must Be Alive
Sodomy requires that the victim be alive at the moment of penetration. (People v.
Davis (1995) 10 Cal.4th 463, 521, fn. 20 [41 Cal.Rptr.2d 826, 896 P.2d 119];
People v. Ramirez (1990) 50 Cal.3d 1158, 1176 [270 Cal.Rptr. 286, 791 P.2d 965].)
Sodomy with a deceased victim can constitute attempted sodomy if the defendant
attempted an act of forcible sodomy while the victim was alive or with the
mistaken belief that the victim was alive. (People v. Davis, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p.
521, fn. 20; People v. Hart (1999) 20 Cal.4th 546, 611 [85 Cal.Rptr.2d 132, 976
Penetration May Be Through Victim’s Clothing
If there is penetration into a victim’s anus by a perpetrator’s sexual organ, it is
sodomy, even if the victim is wearing clothing at the time. (People v. Ribera (2005)
133 Cal.App.4th 81, 85–86 [34 Cal.Rptr.3d 538]).
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