CALCRIM No. 2952. Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code, § 399.5(c))
Judicial Council of California Criminal Jury Instructions (2024 edition)
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2952.Defenses: Negligent Control of Attack Dog (Pen. Code,
§ 399.5(c))
You must find the defendant not guilty of failing to use ordinary care in
(owning/ [or] controlling) an attack dog if:
<Alternative A - trespassing>
[<insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked> (was/
were) trespassing at the time (he/she/they) (was/were) bitten by the
dog][; or/.]
<Alternative B - provocation>
[<insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked>
provoked the dog or otherwise contributed to (his/her/their) own
injuries][; or/.]
<Alternative C - dog doing military or police work>
[The dog was being used in military or police work and the biting
occurred while the dog was actually performing in that capacity.]
[A trespasser is someone who (enters a residence without the consent of
the (owner/owner’s agent/person who lawfully possesses the property)[,]/
[or] enters land (enclosed by a fence/ [or] posted with “no trespassing”
signs) and refuses to leave the property when requested to do so by the
(owner/owner’s agent/person who lawfully possesses the property)[,]/ [or]
<insert other definition of trespasser, see Pen. Code, § 602 et
seq.>).]
[Provoking includes, but is not limited to, approaching, in a threatening
manner, the owner or custodian of a dog held on a leash so that the dog
reacts in a protective manner.]
<Alternative A - reasonable doubt standard>
[The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that
(<insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly attacked> (was/were)
not trespassing[,]/ [or] [ <insert name[s] of person[s]
allegedly attacked>] did not provoke the dog[,]/ [or] the dog was not
being used in military or police work). If the People have not met this
burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of this crime.]
<Alternative B - preponderance standard>
[The defendant has the burden of proving this defense by a
preponderance of the evidence. This is a different standard of proof than
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. To meet the burden of proof by a
preponderance of the evidence, the defendant must prove that it is more
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likely than not that ( <insert name[s] of person[s] allegedly
attacked> (was/were) trespassing[,]/ [or] [ <insert name[s] of
person[s] allegedly attacked>] provoked the dog[,]/ [or] the dog was being
used in military or police work).]
New January 2006
BENCH NOTES
Instructional Duty
Penal Code section 399.5(c) states that “nothing in this section shall authorize the
bringing of an action pursuant” to this statute in the three situations described
above: i.e., the bitten trespasser; the injured party who provokes the dog or who
contributes to his or her own injuries; or the police or military dog performing in
that capacity. No case presently addresses the issue of who must bear the burden of
proving the existence or nonexistence of these facts.
Because the very bringing of a prosecution is barred under the circumstances stated
in subdivision (c), it appears the Legislature intended to place these factual
situations outside the scope of its criminal prohibition. This is to be contrasted with
affirmative defenses such as entrapment, where the defendant’s conduct is within the
statute’s facial reach but subject to an exception to the general rule based on
considerations other than guilt or innocence. (See People v. Mower (2002) 28
Cal.4th 457, 476-483 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067] [discussing at length
affirmative defenses and burdens of proof]; 4 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal
Law (3d ed. 2000), Pretrial Proceedings, § 202.) That being so, the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt the nonexistence of the subdivision (c)
circumstances would properly be placed on the prosecution. (See People v. Mower,
supra, 28 Cal.4th at p. 482 [122 Cal.Rptr.2d 326, 49 P.3d 1067].) However, there
must still be sufficient evidence to permit a reasonable jury to have a reasonable
doubt about whether one or more of the circumstances existed before an instruction
on this issue would be required.
Alternative paragraphs on both the reasonable doubt and preponderance of the
evidence standards have been included. The court must choose, at its discretion,
either alternative A - reasonable doubt standard, or alternative B - preponderance
standard.
AUTHORITY
• Defenses. Pen. Code, § 399.5(c).
SECONDARY SOURCES
2 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (4th ed. 2012) Crimes Against Public
Peace and Welfare, § 455.
CALCRIM No. 2952 VANDALISM, LOITERING, AND TRESPASS
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