3453. Extension of Commitment
<insert name of respondent> has been committed to a mental health facility. You must decide whether (he/she) currently poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others as a result of a mental disease, defect, or disorder. That is the only purpose of this proceeding. You are not being asked to decide <insert name of respondent>'s mental condition at any other time or whether (he/she) is guilty of any crime.
To prove that <insert name of respondent> currently poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others as a result of a mental disease, defect, or disorder, the People must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that:
1. (he/she) suffers from a mental disease, defect, or disorder;
2. As a result of (his/her) mental disease, defect, or disorder, (he/she) now poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others.
[Control of a mental condition through medication is a defense to a petition to extend commitment. To establish this defense, <insert name of respondent> must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that:
1. (he/she) no longer poses a substantial danger of physical harm to others because (he/she) is now taking medicine that controls (his/her) mental condition;
2. (he/she) will continue to take that medicine in an unsupervised environment.
Proof by a preponderance of the evidence is a different burden of proof from proof beyond a reasonable doubt. A fact is proved by a preponderance of the evidence if you conclude that it is more likely than not that the fact is true.]
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on the standard for extending commitment.
Give CALCRIM No. 221, Reasonable Doubt: Bifurcated Trial, and CALCRIM No. 3550, Pre-Deliberation Instructions, as well as any other relevant posttrial instructions, such as CALCRIM No. 222, Evidence, or CALCRIM No. 226, Witnesses.
Instructional Requirements. Pen. Code, § 1026.5(b)(1).
Unanimous Verdict, Burden of Proof. Conservatorship of Roulet (1979) 23 Cal.3d 219, 235 [152 Cal.Rptr. 425, 590 P.2d 1] [discussing conservatorship proceedings under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act and civil commitment proceedings in general].
Affirmative Defense of Medication. People v. Bolden (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 1591, 1600-1602 [266 Cal.Rptr. 724].
5 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Criminal Trial, § 693.
4 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 86, Insanity Trial, § 86.10 (Matthew Bender).
Extension of Commitment
The test for extending a person's commitment is not the same as the test for insanity. (People v. Superior Court (Williams) (1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 477, 490 [284 Cal.Rptr. 601].) The test for insanity is whether the accused "was incapable of knowing or understanding the nature and quality of his or her act or of distinguishing right from wrong at the time of the commission of the offense." (Pen. Code, § 25(b); People v. Skinner (1985) 39 Cal.3d 765 [217 Cal.Rptr. 685, 704 P.2d 752.) In contrast, the standard for recommitment under Penal Code section 1026.5(b) is whether a defendant, "by reason of a mental disease, defect, or disorder [,] represents a substantial danger of physical harm to others." (People v. Superior Court, supra, 233 Cal.App.3d at pp. 489-490; see People v. Wilder (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 90, 99 [39 Cal.Rptr. 2d 247].)
(New January 2006)