3470. Right to Self-Defense or Defense of Another (Non-Homicide)
The defendant is not guilty of <insert crime(s) charged> if (he/she) used force against the other person in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another). The defendant acted in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another) if:
1. The defendant reasonably believed that (he/she/ [or] someone else/ [or] <insert name of third party>) was in imminent danger of suffering bodily injury [or was in imminent danger of being touched unlawfully];
2. The defendant reasonably believed that the immediate use of force was necessary to defend against that danger;
3. The defendant used no more force than was reasonably necessary to defend against that danger.
Belief in future harm is not sufficient, no matter how great or how likely the harm is believed to be. The defendant must have believed there was imminent danger of violence to (himself/ herself/ [or] someone else). Defendant's belief must have been reasonable and (he/she) must have acted because of that belief. The defendant is only entitled to use that amount of force that a reasonable person would believe is necessary in the same situation. If the defendant used more force than was reasonable, the defendant did not act in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).
When deciding whether the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, consider all the circumstances as they were known to and appeared to the defendant and consider what a reasonable person in a similar situation with similar knowledge would have believed. If the defendant's beliefs were reasonable, the danger does not need to have actually existed.
[The defendant's belief that (he/she/ [or] someone else) was threatened may be reasonable even if (he/she) relied on information that was not true. However, the defendant must actually and reasonably have believed that the information was true.]
[If you find that <insert name of victim> threatened or harmed the defendant [or others] in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant's conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]
[If you find that the defendant knew that <insert name of victim> had threatened or harmed others in the past, you may consider that information in deciding whether the defendant's conduct and beliefs were reasonable.]
[Someone who has been threatened or harmed by a person in the past is justified in acting more quickly or taking greater self-defense measures against that person.]
[If you find that the defendant received a threat from someone else that (he/she) reasonably associated with <insert name of victim>, you may consider that threat in deciding whether the defendant was justified in acting in (self-defense/ [or] defense of another).]
[A defendant is not required to retreat. He or she is entitled to stand his or her ground and defend himself or herself and, if reasonably necessary, to pursue an assailant until the danger of (death/bodily injury/ <insert crime>) has passed. This is so even if safety could have been achieved by retreating.]
The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in lawful (self-defense/ [or] defense of another). If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not guilty of <insert crime(s) charged>.
The court has a sua sponte duty to instruct on self-defense when "it appears that the defendant is relying on such a defense, or if there is substantial evidence supportive of such a defense and the defense is not inconsistent with the defendant's theory of the case [citation]." (See People v. Breverman (1998) 19 Cal.4th 142, 157 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870, 960 P.2d 1094] [discussing duty to instruct on defenses generally]; see also People v. Lemus (1988) 203 Cal.App.3d 470, 478 [249 Cal.Rptr. 897] [if substantial evidence of self-defense exists, court must instruct sua sponte and let jury decide credibility of witnesses].)
If there is substantial evidence of self-defense that is inconsistent with the defendant's testimony, the court must ascertain whether the defendant wants an instruction on self-defense. (People v. Breverman, supra, 19 Cal.4th at p. 156 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 870].) The court is then required to give the instruction if the defendant so requests. (People v. Elize (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 605, 611-615 [84 Cal.Rptr.2d 35].)
On defense request and when supported by sufficient evidence, the court must instruct that the jury may consider the effect of "antecedent threats and assaults against the defendant on the reasonableness of defendant's conduct." (People v. Garvin (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 484, 488 [1 Cal.Rptr.3d 774].) The court must also instruct that the jury may consider previous threats or assaults by the aggressor against someone else or threats received by the defendant from a third party that the defendant reasonably associated with the aggressor. (See People v. Pena (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 462, 475 [198 Cal.Rptr. 819]; People v. Minifie (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1055, 1065, 1068 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 133, 920 P.2d 1337]; see also CALCRIM No. 505, Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another.)
CALCRIM No. 505, Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another.
CALCRIM Nos. 3471-3477, Defense Instructions: Defense of Self, Another, Property.
Instructional Requirements. People v. Moody (1943) 62 Cal.App.2d 18 [143 P.2d 978]; People v. Myers (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335, 336 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518].
Lawful Resistance. Pen. Code, §§ 692, 693, 694; Civ. Code, § 50; see also People v. Myers (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 328, 335 [71 Cal.Rptr.2d 518].
Burden of Proof. Pen. Code, § 189.5; People v. Banks (1976) 67 Cal.App.3d 379, 383-384 [137 Cal.Rptr. 652].
Elements. People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1].
Imminence. People v. Aris (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 1178, 1187 [264 Cal.Rptr. 167] (overruled on other grounds in People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1089 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]).
No Duty to Retreat. People v. Hughes (1951) 107 Cal.App.2d 487, 494 [237 P.2d 64]; People v. Hatchett (1942) 56 Cal.App.2d 20, 22 [132 P.2d 51].
Reasonable Belief. People v. Humphrey (1996) 13 Cal.4th 1073, 1082 [56 Cal.Rptr.2d 142, 921 P.2d 1]; People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 377 [181 Cal.Rptr. 682].
1 Witkin & Epstein, California Criminal Law (3d ed. 2000) Defenses, §§ 65, 66, 69, 70.
3 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 73, Defenses and Justifications, §§ 73.11, 73.12 (Matthew Bender).
6 Millman, Sevilla & Tarlow, California Criminal Defense Practice, Ch. 124, Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearings, § 124.04 (Matthew Bender).
Brandishing Weapon in Defense of Another
The defense of others is a defense to a charge of brandishing a weapon under Penal Code section 417(a)(2). (People v. Kirk (1986) 192 Cal.App.3d Supp. 15, 19 [238 Cal.Rptr. 42].)
Ex-Felon in Possession of Weapon
"[W]hen [an ex-felon] is in imminent peril of great bodily harm or . . . reasonably believes himself or others to be in such danger, and without preconceived design on his part a firearm is made available to him, his temporary possession of that weapon for a period no longer than that in which the necessity or apparent necessity to use it in self-defense continues, does not violate [Penal Code] section 12021. . . . [T]he use of the firearm must be reasonable under the circumstances and may be resorted to only if no other alternative means of avoiding the danger are available." (People v. King (1978) 22 Cal.3d 12, 24, 26 [148 Cal.Rptr. 409, 582 P.2d 1000] [error to refuse instructions on self-defense and defense of others]; see also CALCRIM No. 2514, Possession of Firearm by Person Prohibited by Statute: Self-Defense.)
Reasonable Person Standard Not Modified by Evidence of Mental Impairment
In People v. Jefferson (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 508, 519 [14 Cal.Rptr.3d 473], the court rejected the argument that the reasonable person standard for self-defense should be the standard of a mentally ill person like the defendant. "The common law does not take account of a person's mental capacity when determining whether he has acted as the reasonable person would have acted. The law holds 'the mentally deranged or insane defendant accountable for his negligence as if the person were a normal, prudent person.' (Prosser & Keeton, Torts (5th ed. 1984) § 32, p. 177.)" (Ibid.; see also Rest.2d Torts, § 283B.)
See also the Related Issues section of CALCRIM No. 505, Justifiable Homicide: Self-Defense or Defense of Another.
(New January 2006)