CACI No. 1004. Obviously Unsafe Conditions

Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 edition)

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1004.Obviously Unsafe Conditions
If an unsafe condition of the property is so obvious that a person could
reasonably be expected to observe it, then the [owner/occupier/one who
controls the property] does not have to warn others about the dangerous
However, the [owner/occupier/one who controls the property] still must
use reasonable care to protect against the risk of harm if it is foreseeable
that the condition may cause injury to someone who because of necessity
encounters the condition.
New September 2003; Revised May 2018, December 2022
Directions for Use
Give this instruction with CACI No. 1001, Basic Duty of Care, if it is alleged that
the condition causing injury was obvious. The first paragraph addresses the lack of a
duty to warn of an obviously unsafe condition. (Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker
Residential Brokerage Co. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447 [221 Cal.Rptr.3d 701].)
The second paragraph addresses when there may be a duty to take some remedial
action. Landowners may have a duty to take precautions to protect against the risk
of harm from an obviously unsafe condition, even if they do not have a duty to
warn. (Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104, 121-122 [273
Cal.Rptr. 457].)
Sources and Authority
“Foreseeability of harm is typically absent when a dangerous condition is open
and obvious. ‘Generally, if a danger is so obvious that a person could reasonably
be expected to see it, the condition itself serves as a warning, and the landowner
is under no further duty to remedy or warn of the condition.’ In that situation,
owners and possessors of land are entitled to assume others will ‘perceive the
obvious’ and take action to avoid the dangerous condition.” (Jacobs,supra, 14
Cal.App.5th at p. 447, internal citations omitted.)
“[T]here may be situations ‘in which an obvious hazard, for which no warning is
necessary, nonetheless gives rise to a duty on a landowners part to remedy the
hazard because knowledge of the hazard is inadequate to prevent injury.’ This is
so when, for example, the practical necessity of encountering the danger, when
weighed against the apparent risk involved, is such that, under the circumstances,
a person might choose to encounter the danger.” (Johnson v. The Raytheon Co.,
Inc. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 617, 632 [245 Cal.Rptr.3d 282], internal citation
“There may be a duty of care owed even where a dangerous condition is open
and obvious, when ‘it is foreseeable that the danger may cause injury despite the
fact that it is obvious (e.g., when necessity requires persons to encounter it).’ In
other words, ‘the obviousness of the condition and its dangerousness . . . will
not negate a duty of care when it is foreseeable that, because of necessity or
other circumstances, a person may choose to encounter the condition.’ (Montes
v. Young Men’s Christian Assn. of Glendale, California (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
1134, 1140 [297 Cal.Rptr.3d 791], internal citations omitted, original italics.)
“[I]t is foreseeable that even an obvious danger may cause injury, if the practical
necessity of encountering the danger, when weighed against the apparent risk
involved, is such that under the circumstances, a person might choose to
encounter the danger. The foreseeability of injury, in turn, when considered
along with various other policy considerations such as the extent of the burden
to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty to
remedy such danger may lead to the legal conclusion that the defendant ‘owes a
duty of due care “to all persons who are foreseeably endangered by his conduct,
with respect to all risks which make the conduct unreasonably dangerous.”
(Osborn, supra, 224 Cal.App.3d at p. 121, internal citation omitted.)
“[W]hen a worker, whose work requires him or her to encounter a danger which
is obvious or observable, is injured, [t]he jury [is] entitled to balance the
[plaintiff’s] necessity against the danger, even if it be assumed that it was an
apparent one. This [is] a factual issue. [Citations.]’ In other words, under certain
circumstances, an obvious or apparent risk of danger does not automatically
absolve a defendant of liability for injury caused thereby.” (Osborn,supra, 224
Cal.App.3d at p. 118, original italics, internal citations omitted.)
“[T]he obvious nature of a danger is not, in and of itself, sufficient to establish
that the owner of the premises on which the danger is located is not liable for
injuries caused thereby, and that although obviousness of danger may negate any
duty to warn, it does not necessarily negate the duty to remedy.” (Osborn,supra,
224 Cal.App.3d at p. 119.)
“The issue is whether there is any evidence from which a trier of fact could find
that, as a practical necessity, [plaintiff] was foreseeably required to expose
himself to the danger of falling into the empty pool.” (Jacobs,supra, 14
Cal.App.5th at p. 447.)
“It is incorrect to instruct a jury categorically that a business owner cannot be
held liable for an injury resulting from an obvious danger. There may be a duty
to remedy a dangerous condition, even though there is no duty to warn thereof,
if the condition is foreseeable. [¶] . . . The jury was free to consider whether
[the business owner] was directly negligent in failing to correct any foreseeable,
dangerous condition of the cables which may have contributed to the cause of
[the plaintiff’s] injuries.” (Felmlee v. Falcon Cable TV (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th
1032, 1040 [43 Cal.Rptr.2d 158], internal citation omitted.)
“[T]he ‘obvious danger exception to a landowners ordinary duty of care is in
reality a recharacterization of the former assumption of the risk doctrine, i.e.,
where the condition is so apparent that the plaintiff must have realized the
danger involved, he assumes the risk of injury even if the defendant was
negligent. . . . [T]his type of assumption of the risk has now been merged into
comparative negligence.” (Donohue v. San Francisco Housing Authority (1993)
16 Cal.App.4th 658, 665 [20 Cal.Rptr.2d 148], internal citations omitted.)
Secondary Sources
6 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts, §§ 1233, 1267-1269
1 Neil M. Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 15, General Premises Liability,
§ 15.04[4] (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed.)
11 California Real Estate Law & Practice, Ch. 381, Tort Liability of Property
Owners, §§ 381.20, 381.32 (Matthew Bender)
36 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 421, Premises Liability, § 421.14
(Matthew Bender)
17 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 178, Premises Liability, § 178.25 et seq.
(Matthew Bender)

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