California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI)
2402. Breach of Employment Contract - Unspecified Term— Constructive Discharge—Essential Factual Elements
[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] breached their employment contract by forcing [name of plaintiff] to resign. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:
1. That [name of plaintiff] and [name of defendant] entered into an employment relationship. [An employment contract or a provision in an employment contract may be [written or oral/partly written and partly oral/created by the conduct of the parties]];
2. That [name of defendant] promised, by words or conduct, to discharge [name of plaintiff] only for good cause;
3. That [name of plaintiff] substantially performed [his/her] job duties [unless [name of plaintiff]'s performance was excused [or prevented]];
4. That [name of defendant] intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions to exist that were so intolerable that a reasonable person in [name of plaintiff]'s position would have had no reasonable alternative except to resign;
5. That [name of plaintiff] resigned because of the intolerable conditions; and
6. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed by the loss of employment.
To be intolerable, the adverse working conditions must be unusually or repeatedly offensive to a reasonable person in [name of plaintiff]'s position.
Directions for Use
The element of substantial performance should not be confused with the "good cause" defense: "The action is primarily for breach of contract. It was therefore incumbent upon plaintiff to prove that he was able and offered to fulfill all obligations imposed upon him by the contract. Plaintiff ailed to meet this requirement; by voluntarily withdrawing from the contract he excused further performance by defendant." (Kane v. Sklar (1954) 122 Cal.App.2d 480, 482 [265 P.2d 29], internal citation omitted.) Element number 3 may be deleted if substantial performance is not a disputed issue.
Sources and Authority
Labor Code section 2922 provides: "An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month."
Civil Code section 1439 provides, in part: "Before any party to an obligation can require another party to perform any act under it, he must fulfill all conditions precedent thereto imposed upon himself; and must be able and offer to fulfill all conditions concurrent so imposed upon him on the like fulfillment by the other party. . . ."
"Where there is no express agreement, the issue is whether other evidence of the parties' conduct has a 'tendency in reason' to demonstrate the existence of an actual mutual understanding on particular terms and conditions of employment. If such evidence logically permits conflicting inferences, a question of fact is presented. But where the undisputed facts negate the existence or the breach of the contract claimed, summary judgment is proper." (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 337 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089], internal citations omitted.)
The employee bears the ultimate burden of proving that he or she was wrongfully terminated. (Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc. (Pugh I) (1981) 116 Cal.App.3d 311, 330 [171 Cal.Rptr. 917].)
"Standing alone, constructive discharge is neither a tort nor a breach of contact, but a doctrine that transforms what is ostensibly a resignation into a firing. Even after establishing constructive discharge, an employee must independently prove a breach of contract or tort in connection with employment termination in order to obtain damages for wrongful discharge." (Turner v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1238, 1251 [32 Cal.Rptr.2d 223, 876 P.2d 1022], internal citation omitted.)
"The presumption that an employment relationship of indefinite duration is intended to be terminable at will is therefore 'subject, like any presumption, to contrary evidence. This may take the form of an greement, express or implied, that . . . the employment relationship will continue indefinitely, pending the occurrence of some event such as the employer's dissatisfaction with the employee's services or the existence of some "cause" for termination.' " (Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 680 [254 Cal.Rptr. 211, 765 P.2d 373], internal citation omitted.)
"In Foley, we identified several factors, apart from express terms, that may bear upon 'the existence and content of an . . . [implied-in-fact] agreement' placing limits on the employer's right to discharge an employee. These factors might include ' "the personnel policies or practices of the employer, the employee's longevity of service, actions or communications by the employer reflecting assurances of continued employment, and the practices of the industry in which the employee is engaged." ' " (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 336-337 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089], internal citations omitted.)
Civil Code sections 1619-1621 together provide as follows: "A contract is either express or implied. An express contract is one, the terms of which are stated in words. An implied contract is one, the existence and terms of which are manifested by conduct."
" 'Good cause' or 'just cause' for termination connotes ' "a fair and honest cause or reason," ' regulated by the good faith of the employer. The term is relative. Whether good cause exists is dependent upon the particular circumstances of each case. In deciding whether good cause exists, there must be a balance between the employer's interest in operating its business efficiently and profitably and the employee's interest in continued employment. Care must be exercised so as not to interfere with the employer's legitimate exercise of managerial discretion. While the scope of such discretion is substantial, it is not unrestricted. Good cause is not properly found where the asserted reasons for discharge are 'trivial, capricious, unrelated to business needs or goals, or pretextual.' Where there is a contract to terminate only for good cause, the employer has no right to terminate for an arbitrary or unreasonable decision." (Walker v. Blue Cross of California (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 985, 994 [6 Cal.Rptr.2d 184], internal citations omitted, abrogated on another ground in Guz, supra, 24 Cal.4th at p. 351.)
"Constructive discharge occurs when the employer's conduct effectively forces an employee to resign. Although the employee may say, 'I quit,' the employment relationship is actually severed involuntarily by the employer's acts, against the employee's will. As a result, a constructive ischarge is legally regarded as a firing rather than a resignation." (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at pp. 1245-1246, internal citation omitted.)
"In order to amount to constructive discharge, adverse working conditions must be unusually 'aggravated' or amount to a 'continuous pattern' before the situation will be deemed intolerable. In general, '[s]ingle, trivial, or isolated acts of [misconduct] are insufficient' to support a constructive discharge claim. Moreover, a poor performance rating or a demotion, even when accompanied by reduction in pay, does not by itself trigger a constructive discharge." (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, internal citation and fns. omitted.)
"Whether conditions were so intolerable as to justify a reasonable employee's decision to resign is normally a question of fact." (Valdez v. City of Los Angeles (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1043, 1056 [282 Cal.Rptr. 726].)
"In some circumstances, a single intolerable incident, such as a crime of violence against an employee by an employer, or an employer's ultimatum that an employee commit a crime, may constitute a constructive discharge. Such misconduct potentially could be found 'aggravated.' " (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1247, fn. 3.)
"[T]he standard by which a constructive discharge is determined is an objective one-the question is 'whether a reasonable person faced with the allegedly intolerable employer actions or conditions of employment would have no reasonable alternative except to quit.' " (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1248, internal citations omitted.)
"In order to establish a constructive discharge, an employee must plead and prove, by the usual preponderance of the evidence standard, that the employer either intentionally created or knowingly permitted working conditions that were so intolerable or aggravated at the time of the employee's resignation that a reasonable employer would realize that a reasonable person in the employee's position would be compelled to resign. [¶]For purposes of this standard, the requisite knowledge or intent must exist on the part of either the employer or those persons who effectively represent the employer, i.e., its officers, directors, managing agents, or supervisory employees." (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1251.)
"The length of time the plaintiff remained on the job may be one relevant factor in determining the intolerability of employment conditions from the standpoint of a reasonable person. Neither logic nor precedent suggests it should always be dispositive." (Turner, supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 1254.)
"The general rule is that the measure of recovery by a wrongfully discharged employee is the amount of salary agreed upon for the period of service, less the amount which the employer affirmatively proves the employee has earned or with reasonable effort might have earned from other employment." (Parker v. Twentieth Century Fox-Film Corp. (1970) 3 Cal.3d 176, 181 [89 Cal.Rptr. 737, 474 P.2d 689], internal citations omitted.)
2 Witkin, Summary of California Law (2000 supp.) Agency and Employment, §§ 184 M-184 O
4 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 60, Liability for Wrongful Termination and Discipline, §§ 60.05, 60.07 (Matthew Bender)
1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed. 1997) Contract Actions, §§ 8.1-8.21
21 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 249, Employment Law: Termination and Discipline, § 249.15 (Matthew Bender)
Bancroft-Whitney's Cal. Civil Practice: Employment Litigation (1993) Termination of Employment, §§ 6:11-6:13, 6:18
(New September 2003)