CACI No. 2502. Disparate Impact - Essential Factual Elements (Gov. Code, § 12940(a))

Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2025 edition)

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2502.Disparate Impact - Essential Factual Elements (Gov. Code,
§ 12940(a))
[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] had [an employment
practice/a selection policy] that wrongfully discriminated against [him/
her/nonbinary pronoun]. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must
prove all of the following:
1. That [name of defendant] was [an employer/[other covered entity]];
2. That [name of plaintiff] [was an employee of [name of defendant]/
applied to [name of defendant] for a job/[other covered relationship
to defendant]];
3. That [name of defendant] had [an employment practice of [describe
practice]/a selection policy of [describe policy]] that had a
disproportionate adverse effect on [describe protected group - for
example, persons over the age of 40];
4. That [name of plaintiff] is [protected status];
5. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and
6. That [name of defendant]’s [employment practice/selection policy]
was a substantial factor in causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.
New September 2003; Revised June 2011, May 2024*
Directions for Use
This instruction is intended for disparate impact employment discrimination claims.
Disparate impact occurs when an employer has an employment practice that appears
neutral but has an adverse impact on members of a protected group and cannot be
justified by business necessity. (Jumaane v. City of Los Angeles (2015) 241
Cal.App.4th 1390, 1405 [194 Cal.Rptr.3d 689].)
If the defendant’s status as employer is in dispute, the court may need to instruct the
jury on the statutory definition of “employer” under the FEHA, which can include
business entities acting as agents of employers. (Gov. Code, § 12926(d); Raines v.
U.S. Healthworks Medical Group (2023) 15 Cal.5th 268, 291 [312 Cal.Rptr.3d 301,
534 P.3d 40].) Other covered entities under the FEHA include labor organizations,
employment agencies, and apprenticeship training programs. (See Gov. Code,
§ 12940(b)-(h), (j), (k).)
The court should consider instructing the jury on the meaning of “adverse impact,”
tailored to the facts of the case and the applicable law.
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Sources and Authority
Discrimination Prohibited Under Fair Employment and Housing Act.
Government Code section 12940(a).
Disparate Impact May Prove Age Discrimination. Government Code section
12941.1.
Justification for Disparate Impact. Cal. Code Regs., tit. 2, §§ 11010(b), 11017(a),
(e).
“The California Fair Employment and Housing Act, which defines ‘employer to
‘include[]’ ‘any person acting as an agent of an employer,’ permits a business
entity acting as an agent of an employer to be held directly liable as an
employer for employment discrimination in violation of the FEHA in appropriate
circumstances when the business-entity agent has at least five employees and
carries out FEHA-regulated activities on behalf of an employer. We do not
decide the significance, if any, of employer control over the act(s) of the agent
that gave rise to the FEHA violation, and we also do not decide whether our
conclusion extends to business-entity agents that have fewer than five employees.
We base our conclusion on our interpretation of the FEHAs definition of
employer; we express no view of the scope of a business entity agent’s possible
liability under the FEHAs aider and abettor provision.” (Raines, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 291, internal citations omitted.)
“Prohibited discrimination may . . . be found on a theory of disparate impact,
i.e., that regardless of motive, a facially neutral employer practice or policy,
bearing no manifest relationship to job requirements, in fact had a
disproportionate adverse effect on members of the protected class.” (Guz v.
Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354, fn. 20 [100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8
P.3d 1089], internal citations omitted.)
“A ‘disparate impact’ plaintiff . . . may prevail without proving intentional
discrimination . . . [However,] a disparate impact plaintiff ‘must not merely
prove circumstances raising an inference of discriminatory impact; he must
prove the discriminatory impact at issue.’ (Ibarbia v. Regents of the University
of California (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 1318, 1329-1330 [237 Cal.Rptr. 92],
quoting Lowe v. City of Monrovia (9th Cir. 1985) 775 F.2d 998, 1004.)
‘To establish a prima facie case of discrimination, a plaintiff must show that
the facially neutral employment practice had a significantly discriminatory
impact. If that showing is made, the employer must then demonstrate that “any
given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to the employment in question,”
in order to avoid a finding of discrimination . . . Even in such a case, however,
the plaintiff may prevail, if he shows that the employer was using the practice as
a mere pretext for discrimination.’ (City and County of San Francisco v. Fair
Employment and Housing Com. (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 976, 985 [236 Cal.Rptr.
716], quoting Connecticut v. Teal (1982) 457 U.S. 440, 446-447 [102 S.Ct.
2525, 73 L.Ed.2d 130], internal citation omitted.)
“It is well settled that valid statistical evidence is required to prove disparate
CACI No. 2502 FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT
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impact discrimination, that is, that a facially neutral policy has caused a
protected group to suffer adverse effects. “Once the employment practice at
issue has been identified, causation must be proved; that is, the plaintiff must
offer statistical evidence of a kind and degree sufficient to show that the practice
in question has caused the exclusion of applicants for jobs or promotions
because of their membership in a protected group. . . . [S]tatistical disparities
must be sufficiently substantial that they raise such an inference of
causation.” (Jumaane, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 1405.)
Under federal title VII, a plaintiff may establish an unlawful employment
practice based on disparate impact in one of two ways: (1) the plaintiff
demonstrates that a defendant uses a particular employment practice that causes
a disparate impact on the basis of a protected status, and the defendant “fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position in
question and consistent with business necessity”; or (2) the plaintiff demonstrates
that there is an alternative employment practice with less adverse impact, and the
defendant “refuses to adopt such alternative employment practice.” (42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-2(k)(1)(A).)
Secondary Sources
Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, Ch. 4-A, Employment
Presumed At Will, 4:25 (The Rutter Group)
Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, Ch. 7-A, Title VII
And The California Fair Employment And Housing Act, ¶¶ 7:530, 7:531, 7:535 (The
Rutter Group)
1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Discrimination
Claims, § 2.65
2 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 41, Substantive Requirements Under
Equal Employment Opportunity Laws, § 41.21 (Matthew Bender)
3 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 43, Civil Actions Under Equal
Employment Opportunity Laws, § 43.01[2][c] (Matthew Bender)
11 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 115, Civil Rights: Employment
Discrimination, § 115.23[4] (Matthew Bender)
California Civil Practice: Employment Litigation, § 2:23 (Thomson Reuters)
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