CACI No. 2507. “Substantial Motivating Reason” Explained

Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2017 edition)

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2507.“Substantial Motivating Reason” Explained

A “substantial motivating reason” is a reason that actually contributed

to the [specify adverse employment action]. It must be more than a

remote or trivial reason. It does not have to be the only reason

motivating the [adverse employment action].

New December 2007; Revised June 2013

Directions for Use

Read this instruction with CACI No. 2500, Disparate Treatment—Essential Factual

Elements, CACI No. 2505, Retaliation—Essential Factual Elements, CACI No.

2540, Disability Discrimination—Disparate Treatment—Essential Factual Elements,

CACI No. 2560, Religious Creed Discrimination—Failure to

Accommodate—Essential Factual Elements, or CACI No. 2570, Age

Discrimination—Disparate Treatment—Essential Factual Elements.

Sources and Authority

• Discrimination Prohibited Under Fair Employment and Housing Act.

Government Code section 12940(a).

• Causation Under Federal Law. Title 42 United States Code section 2000e-2(m).

• “Substantial Motivating Factor” Explained. Title 2 California Code of

Regulations section 11009(c).

• “Because of the similarity between state and federal employment discrimination

laws, California courts look to pertinent federal precedent when applying our

own statutes.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 354 [100

Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089].)

• “While a complainant need not prove that [discriminatory] animus was the sole

motivation behind a challenged action, he must prove by a preponderance of the

evidence that there was a ‘causal connection’ between the employee’s protected

status and the adverse employment decision.” (Mixon v. Fair Employment and

Housing Com. (1987) 192 Cal.App.3d 1306, 1319 [237 Cal.Rptr. 884].)

• “The employee need not show ‘he would have in any event been rejected or

discharged solely on the basis of his race, without regard to the alleged

deﬁciencies. . . .’ In other words, ‘while a complainant need not prove that

racial animus was the sole motivation behind the challenged action, he must

prove by a preponderance of the evidence that there was a “causal connection”

between the employee’s protected status and the adverse employment

decision.’ ” (Clark v. Claremont University Center (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 639,

665 [8 Cal.Rptr.2d 151], citing McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co. (1976)

427 U.S. 273, 282, fn. 10 [96 S.Ct. 2574, 49 L.Ed.2d 493, 502] and Mixon,

supra, 192 Cal.App.3d at p. 1319.)

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• “Requiring the plaintiff to show that discrimination was a substantial motivating

factor, rather than simply amotivating factor, more effectively ensures that

liability will not be imposed based on evidence of mere thoughts or passing

statements unrelated to the disputed employment decision. At the same

time, . . . proof that discrimination was a substantial factor in an employment

decision triggers the deterrent purpose of the FEHA and thus exposes the

employer to liability, even if other factors would have led the employer to make

the same decision at the time.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56

Cal.4th 203, 232 [152 Cal.Rptr.3d 392, 294 P.3d 49], original italics.)

• “We do not suggest that discrimination must be alone sufficient to bring about

an employment decision in order to constitute a substantial motivating factor.

But it is important to recognize that discrimination can be serious,

consequential, and even by itself determinative of an employment decision

without also being a “but for” cause.” (Harris,supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 229.)

• “Although [plaintiff] contends that a jury in an employment discrimination case

would not draw any meaningful distinction between ‘a motivating reason’ and

‘a substantial motivating reason’ in deciding whether there was unlawful

discrimination, the Supreme Court reached a contrary conclusion in Harris

[supra]. The court speciﬁcally concluded that ‘[r]equiring the plaintiff to show

that discrimination was a substantial motivating factor, rather than simply a

motivating factor, more effectively ensures that liability will not be imposed

based on evidence of mere thoughts or passing statements unrelated to the

disputed employment decision.’ ” (Alamo v. Practice Management Information

Corp. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 466, 479 [161 Cal.Rptr.3d 758].)

Secondary Sources

Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, Ch. 7-A, Title VII

And The California Fair Employment And Housing Act, ¶¶ 7:485–7:508 (The Rutter

Group)

1 Wrongful Employment Termination Practice (Cont.Ed.Bar 2d ed.) Discrimination

Claims, §§ 2.61–2.65, 2.87

2 Wilcox, California Employment Law, Ch. 41, Substantive Requirements Under

Equal Employment Opportunity Laws, § 41.11[1] (Matthew Bender)

11 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 115, Civil Rights: Employment

Discrimination, § 115.23[2] (Matthew Bender)

California Civil Practice: Employment Litigation, §§ 2:20–2:21, 2:75 (Thomson

Reuters)

CACI No. 2507 FAIR EMPLOYMENT AND HOUSING ACT

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