California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) (2017)

3022. Gender Price Discrimination (Civ. Code, § 51.6) - Essential Factual Elements

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3022.Unreasonable Search—Search With a Warrant—Essential
Factual Elements (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] carried out an
unreasonable search of [his/her] [person/home/automobile/office/[insert
other]]. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove the
1. That [name of defendant] searched [name of plaintiff]’s [person/
home/automobile/office/[insert other]];
2. That [name of defendant]’s search was unreasonable;
3. That [name of defendant] was acting or purporting to act in the
performance of [his/her] official duties;
4. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and
5. That [name of defendant]’s unreasonable search was a substantial
factor in causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.
In deciding whether the search was unreasonable, you should consider,
among other factors, the following:
(a) The scope of the warrant;
(b) The extent of the particular intrusion;
(c) The place in which the search was conducted; [and]
(d) The manner in which the search was conducted; [and]
(e) [Insert other applicable factor].
New September 2003; Renumbered from CACI No. 3002 December 2012
Directions for Use
The “official duties” referred to in element 3 must be duties created pursuant to any
state, county, or municipal law, ordinance, or regulation. This aspect of color of law
most likely will not be an issue for the jury, so it has been omitted to shorten the
wording of element 3.
Sources and Authority
• “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to
the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, provides: ‘The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.’ ”
(Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163, 171 [52
Cal.Rptr.2d 777], internal citation omitted.)
• “Excessive or unnecessary destruction of property in the course of a search may
violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is lawful and the
fruits of the search not subject to suppression.” (U.S. v. Ramirez (1998) 523
U.S. 65, 71 [118 S.Ct. 992, 140 L.Ed.2d 191.)
• “ ‘The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is not capable of
precise definition or mechanical application. In each case it requires a balancing
of the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that
the search entails. Courts must consider the scope of the particular intrusion, the
manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the place
in which it is conducted.’ ” (Sacramento County Deputy Sheriffs’ Assn. v.
County of Sacramento (1996) 51 Cal.App.4th 1468, 1477 [59 Cal.Rptr.2d 834],
internal citation omitted.)
• “ ‘[T]he Fourth Amendment proscribes only “unreasonable” searches and
seizures.’ The reasonableness of a search or seizure depends ‘not only on when
[it] is made, but also how it is carried out.’ ‘In other words, even when
supported by probable cause, a search or seizure may be invalid if carried out
in an unreasonable fashion.’ ” (Cameron v. Craig (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3d 1012,
1021, original italics, internal citation omitted.)
• “The Supreme Court has interpreted the phrase ‘under “color” of law’ to mean
‘under “pretense” of law.’ A police officer’s actions are under pretense of law
only if they are ‘in some way “related to the performance of his official
duties.’ ” By contrast, an officer who is ‘ “pursuing his own goals and is not in
any way subject to control by [his public employer],’ ” does not act under color
of law, unless he ‘purports or pretends’ to do so. Officers who engage in
confrontations for personal reasons unrelated to law enforcement, and do not
‘purport[] or pretend[]’ to be officers, do not act under color of law.” (Huffman
v. County of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1998) 147 F.3d 1054, 1058, internal citations
• “[P]rivate parties ordinarily are not subject to suit under section 1983, unless,
sifting the circumstances of the particular case, the state has so significantly
involved itself in the private conduct that the private parties may fairly be
termed state actors. Among the factors considered are whether the state
subsidized or heavily regulated the conduct, or compelled or encouraged the
particular conduct, whether the private actor was performing a function which
normally is performed exclusively by the state, and whether there was a
symbiotic relationship rendering the conduct joint state action.” (Robbins v.
Hamburger Home for Girls (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 671, 683 [38 Cal.Rptr.2d
534], internal citations omitted.)
• “Private parties act under color of state law if they willfully participate in joint
action with state officials to deprive others of constitutional rights. Private
parties involved in such a conspiracy may be liable under section 1983.”
(United Steelworkers of America v. Phelps Dodge Corp. (9th Cir. 1989) 865
F.2d 1539, 1540, internal citations omitted.)
Secondary Sources
8 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Constitutional Law, §§ 816,
819 et seq.
3 Civil Rights Actions, Ch. 10, Deprivation of Rights Under Color of State
Law—Law Enforcement and Prosecution, ¶ 10.04 (Matthew Bender)
11 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 113, Civil Rights: The Post-Civil
War Civil Rights Statutes, § 113.14 (Matthew Bender)