California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) (2017)

3043. Violation of Prisoner’s Federal Civil Rights—Eighth Amendment—Deprivation of Necessities (42 U.S.C. § 1983)

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3043.Violation of Prisoner’s Federal Civil Rights—Eighth
Amendment—Deprivation of Necessities (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] subjected [him/her] to
prison conditions that deprived [him/her] of basic rights. To establish
this claim, [name of plaintiff] must prove all of the following:
1. That [name of plaintiff] was imprisoned under conditions that
deprived [him/her] of [describe deprivation, e.g., clothing];
2. That this deprivation was sufficiently serious in that it denied
[name of plaintiff] a minimal necessity of life;
3. That [name of defendant]’s conduct created a substantial risk of
serious harm to [name of plaintiff]’s health or safety;
4. That [name of defendant] knew that [his/her] conduct created a
substantial risk of serious harm to [name of plaintiff]’s health or
safety;
5. That there was no reasonable justification for the deprivation;
6. That [name of defendant] was acting or purporting to act in the
performance of [his/her] official duties;
7. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and
8. That [name of defendant]’s conduct was a substantial factor in
causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.
Whether the risk was obvious is a factor that you may consider in
determining whether [name of defendant] knew of the risk.
New June 2015
Directions for Use
Give this instruction in a prisoner case involving deprivation of something serious.
(See Thomas v. Ponder (9th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 1144, 1150–1151.) For an
instruction involving the creation of a risk, see CACI No. 3040, Violation of
Prisoner’s Federal Civil Rights—Eighth Amendment—Substantial Risk of Serious
Harm. For an instruction on deprivation of medical care, see CACI No. 3041,
Violation of Prisoner’s Federal Civil Rights—Eighth Amendment—Medical Care.
In prison-conditions cases, the inmate must show that the defendant was
deliberately indifferent to his or her health or safety. (Farmer v. Brennan (1994)
511 U.S. 825, 834 [114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811].) “Deliberate indifference”
involves a two-part inquiry. First, the inmate must show that the prison officials
were aware of a substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate’s health or safety.
Second, the inmate must show that the prison officials had no reasonable
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justification for the conduct, in spite of that risk. (Thomas,supra, 611 F.3d at p.
1150.) Elements 4 and 5 express the deliberate-indifference components.
The “official duties” referred to in element 6 must be duties created by any state,
county, or municipal law, ordinance, or regulation. This aspect of color of law most
likely will not be an issue for the jury, so it has been omitted to shorten the
wording of element 6.
Sources and Authority
• Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights. Title 42 United States Code section
1983.
“It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment.” (Helling v. McKinney (1993) 509 U.S. 25, 31 [113 S.Ct. 2475,
125 L.Ed.2d 22].)
• “Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate
shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” (Johnson
v. Lewis (9th Cir. 2000) 217 F.3d 726, 731, internal citations omitted.)
• “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement
claim. Because routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society,’ ‘only those deprivations denying “the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” are sufficiently grave to form
the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.’ ” (Hudson v. McMillian (1992)
503 U.S. 1, 9 [112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156], internal citations omitted.)
• “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements
are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,’
a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ . . . .” (Farmer, supra, 511 U.S. at p.
834, internal citations omitted.)
• “ ‘[O]nly the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth
Amendment.’ To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison
official must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’ In prison-conditions
cases that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or
safety . . . .” (Farmer,supra, 511 U.S. at p. 834, internal citations omitted.)
• “[A]n inmate seeking to prove an Eighth Amendment violation must
‘objectively show that he was deprived of something “sufficiently serious,” ’ and
‘make a subjective showing that the deprivation occurred with deliberate
indifference to the inmate’s health or safety.’ The second step, showing
‘deliberate indifference,’ involves a two part inquiry. First, the inmate must
show that the prison officials were aware of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’
to an inmate’s health or safety. This part of our inquiry may be satisfied if the
inmate shows that the risk posed by the deprivation is obvious. Second, the
inmate must show that the prison officials had no ‘reasonable’ justification for
the deprivation, in spite of that risk.” (Thomas,supra, 611 F.3d at p. 1150,
footnote and internal citations omitted.)
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• “Next, the inmate must ‘make a subjective showing that the deprivation
occurred with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety.’ To satisfy
this subjective component of deliberate indifference, the inmate must show that
prison officials ‘kn[e]w[] of and disregard[ed]’ the substantial risk of harm, but
the officials need not have intended any harm to befall the inmate; ‘it is enough
that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk
of serious harm.’ ” (Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. (9th Cir. 2013) 726
F.3d 1062, 1074, internal citations omitted.)
• “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a
question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference
from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison
official knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”
(Farmer,supra, 511 U.S. at p. 842, internal citation omitted.)
• “When instructing juries in deliberate indifference cases with such issues of
proof, courts should be careful to ensure that the requirement of subjective
culpability is not lost. It is not enough merely to find that a reasonable person
would have known, or that the defendant should have known, and juries should
be instructed accordingly.” (Farmer,supra, 511 U.S. at p. 843 fn. 8.)
• “The precise role of legitimate penological interests is not entirely clear in the
context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions of confinement. The
Supreme Court has written that the test of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107
S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), which requires only a reasonable relationship
to a legitimate penological interest to justify prison regulations, does not apply
to Eighth Amendment claims. The existence of a legitimate penological
justification has, however, been used in considering whether adverse treatment
is sufficiently gratuitous to constitute punishment for Eighth Amendment
purposes.” (Grenning v. Miller-Stout (9th Cir. 2014) 739 F.3d 1235, 1240.)
Secondary Sources
8 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2010) Constitutional Law, § 816
3Civil Rights Actions, Ch. 11, Deprivation of Rights Under Color of State
Law—Prisons, ¶ 11.02 (Matthew Bender)
11 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 113, Civil Rights: The Post-Civil
War Civil Rights Statutes, § 113.14 (Matthew Bender)
18 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 196, Public Entities, § 196.183 (Matthew
Bender)
3044–3049. Reserved for Future Use
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