California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI) (2017)

3060. Unruh Civil Rights Act—Essential Factual Elements (Civ. Code, §§ 51, 52)

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3060.Unruh Civil Rights Act—Essential Factual Elements (Civ.
Code, §§ 51, 52)
[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] denied [him/her] full
and equal [accommodations/advantages/facilities/privileges/services]
because of [his/her] [sex/race/color/religion/ancestry/ national origin/
disability/medical condition/genetic information/marital status/sexual
orientation/citizenship/primary language/immigration status/[insert other
actionable characteristic]]. To establish this claim, [name of plaintiff] must
prove all of the following:
1. That [name of defendant] [denied/aided or incited a denial
of/discriminated or made a distinction that denied] full and equal
[accommodations/advantages/facilities/privileges/services] to
[name of plaintiff];
2. [That a substantial motivating reason for [name of defendant]’s
conduct was [its perception of] [name of plaintiff]’s
[sex/race/color/religion/ancestry/national origin/medical condition/
genetic information/marital status/sexual orientation/citizenship/
primary language/immigration status/[insert other actionable
characteristic]];]
2. [That the [sex/race/color/religion/ancestry/national origin/medical
condition/genetic information/marital status/sexual orientation/
citizenship/primary language/immigration status/[insert other
actionable characteristic]] of a person whom [name of plaintiff]
was associated with was a substantial motivating reason for
[name of defendant]’s conduct;]
3. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and
4. That [name of defendant]’s conduct was a substantial factor in
causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.
New September 2003; Revised December 2011, June 2012; Renumbered from CACI
No. 3020 December 2012; Revised June 2013, June 2016
Directions for Use
Select the bracketed option from element 2 that is most appropriate to the facts of
the case.
Note that element 2 uses the term “substantial motivating reason” to express both
intent and causation between the protected classification and the defendant’s
conduct. “Substantial motivating reason” has been held to be the appropriate
standard under the Fair Employment and Housing Act to address the possibility of
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both discriminatory and nondiscriminatory motives. (See Harris v. City of Santa
Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 232 [152 Cal.Rptr.3d 392, 294 P.3d 49]; CACI No.
2507, “Substantial Motivating Reason” Explained.) Whether the FEHA standard
applies under the Unruh Act has not been addressed by the courts.
With the exception of claims that are also violations of the Americans With
Disabilities Act (ADA) (see Munson v. Del Taco, Inc. (2009) 46 Cal.4th 661, 665
[94 Cal.Rptr.3d 685, 208 P.3d 623]), intentional discrimination is required for
violations of the Unruh Act. (See Harris v. Capital Growth Investors XIV (1991) 52
Cal.3d 1142, 1149 [278 Cal.Rptr. 614, 805 P.2d 873].) The intent requirement is
encompassed within the motivating-reason element. For claims that are also
violations of the ADA, do not give element 2.
Note that there are two causation elements. There must be a causal link between
the discriminatory intent and the adverse action (see element 2), and there must be
a causal link between the adverse action and the harm (see element 4).
For an instruction on damages under the Unruh Act, see CACI No. 3067, Unruh
Civil Rights Act—Damages. Note that the jury may award a successful plaintiff up
to three times actual damages but not less than $4,000 regardless of any actual
damages. (Civ. Code, § 52(a).) In this regard, harm is presumed, and elements 3
and 4 may be considered as established if no actual damages are sought. (See Koire
v. Metro Car Wash (1985) 40 Cal.3d 24, 33 [219 Cal.Rptr. 133, 707 P.2d 195]
[Unruh Act violations are per se injurious]; Civ. Code, § 52(a) [provides for
minimum statutory damages for every violation regardless of the plaintiff’s actual
damages]; see also Civ. Code, § 52(h) [“actual damages” means special and general
damages].)
The judge may decide the issue of whether the defendant is a business
establishment as a matter of law. (Rotary Club of Duarte v. Bd. of Directors (1986)
178 Cal.App.3d 1035, 1050 [224 Cal.Rptr. 213].) Special interrogatories may be
needed if there are factual issues. This element has been omitted from the
instruction because it is unlikely to go to a jury.
The Act is not limited to the categories expressly mentioned in the statute. Other
forms of arbitrary discrimination by business establishments are prohibited. (In re
Cox (1970) 3 Cal.3d 205, 216 [90 Cal.Rptr. 24, 474 P.2d 992].) Therefore, this
instruction allows the user to “insert other actionable characteristic” throughout.
Nevertheless, there are limitations on expansion beyond the statutory classifications.
First, the claim must be based on a personal characteristic similar to those listed in
the statute. Second, the court must consider whether the alleged discrimination was
justified by a legitimate business reason. Third, the consequences of allowing the
claim to proceed must be taken into account. (Semler v. General Electric Capital
Corp. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1380, 1392–1393 [127 Cal.Rptr.3d 794]; see Harris,
supra, 52 Cal.3d at pp. 1159–1162.) However, these issues are most likely to be
resolved by the court rather than the jury. (See Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p.
1165.) Therefore, no elements are included to address what may be an “other
actionable characteristic.” If there are contested factual issues, additional
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instructions or special interrogatories may be necessary.
Sources and Authority
• Unruh Civil Rights Act. Civil Code section 51.
Remedies Under Unruh Act. Civil Code section 52.
• “The Unruh Act was enacted to ‘create and preserve a nondiscriminatory
environment in California business establishments by “banishing” or
“eradicating” arbitrary, invidious discrimination by such establishments.’ ”
(Flowers v. Prasad (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 930, 937 [190 Cal.Rptr.3d 33].)
• “Invidious discrimination is the treatment of individuals in a manner that is
malicious, hostile, or damaging.” (Javorsky v. Western Athletic Clubs, Inc.
(2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1386, 1404 [195 Cal.Rptr.3d 706].)
• “ ‘The Legislature used the words “all” and “of every kind whatsoever” in
referring to business establishments covered by the Unruh Act, and the
inclusion of these words without any exception and without specification of
particular kinds of enterprises, leaves no doubt that the term “business
establishments” was used in the broadest sense reasonably possible. The word
“business” embraces everything about which one can be employed, and it is
often synonymous with “calling, occupation, or trade, engaged in for the
purpose of making a livelihood or gain.” The word “establishment,” as broadly
defined, includes not only a fixed location, such as the “place where one is
permanently fixed for residence or business,” but also a permanent “commercial
force or organization” or “a permanent settled position, (as in life or
business).” ’ ” (O’Connor v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1983) 33 Cal.3d 790,
795 [191 Cal.Rptr. 320, 662 P.2d 427], internal citations omitted.)
• Whether a defendant is a “business establishment” is decided as an issue of law.
(Rotary Club of Duarte, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 1050.)
• “Here, the City was not acting as a business establishment. It was amending an
already existing municipal code section to increase the minimum age of a
responsible person from the age of 21 years to 30. The City was not directly
discriminating against anyone and nothing in the plain language of the Unruh
Civil Rights Act makes its provisions applicable to the actions taken by the
City.” (Harrison v. City of Rancho Mirage (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th 162, 175
[196 Cal.Rptr.3d 267].)
• “In addition to the particular forms of discrimination specifically outlawed by
the Act (sex, race, color, etc.), courts have held the Act ‘prohibit[s]
discrimination based on several classifications which are not specifically
enumerated in the statute.’ These judicially recognized classifications include
unconventional dress or physical appearance, families with children,
homosexuality, and persons under 18.” (Hessians Motorcycle Club v. J.C.
Flanagans (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 833, 836 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 552], internal
citations omitted.)
• “[T]here is no dispute that California courts have applied the Act to
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discrimination based on age. Furthermore, the Act targets not just the practice
of outright exclusion, but pricing differentials as well.” (Javorsky, supra, 242
Cal.App.4th at p. 1394, internal citations omitted.)
• “[T]he language and history of the Unruh Act indicate that the legislative object
was to prohibit intentional discrimination in access to public accommodations.
We have been directed to no authority, nor have we located any, that would
justify extension of a disparate impact test, which has been developed and
applied by the federal courts primarily in employment discrimination cases, to a
general discrimination-in-public-accommodations statute like the Unruh Act.
Although evidence of adverse impact on a particular group of persons may have
probative value in public accommodations cases and should therefore be
admitted in appropriate cases subject to the general rules of evidence, a plaintiff
must nonetheless plead and prove a case of intentional discrimination to recover
under the Act.” (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p. 1149.)
• “On examining the language, statutory context, and history of section 51,
subdivision (f), we conclude . . . [t]he Legislature’s intent in adding
subdivision (f) was to provide disabled Californians injured by violations of the
ADA with the remedies provided by section 52. A plaintiff who establishes a
violation of the ADA, therefore, need not prove intentional discrimination in
order to obtain damages under section 52.” (Munson, supra, 46 Cal.4th at p.
665.)
• “Civil Code section 51, subdivision (f) states: ‘A violation of the right of any
individual under the federal [ADA] shall also constitute a violation of this
section.’ The ADA provides in pertinent part: ‘No individual shall be
discriminated against on the basis of disability in the full and equal enjoyment
of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or accommodations of
any place of public accommodation by any person who . . . operates a place of
public accommodation.’ The ADA defines discrimination as ‘a failure to make
reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures, when such
modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges,
advantages, or accommodations to individuals with disabilities, unless the entity
can demonstrate that making such modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or
accommodations.’ ” (Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co. (2013) 217
Cal.App.4th 1438, 1446 [159 Cal.Rptr.3d 825], internal citations omitted.)
• “ ‘Although the Unruh Act proscribes “any form of arbitrary discrimination,”
certain types of discrimination have been denominated “reasonable” and,
therefore, not arbitrary.’ Thus, for example, ‘legitimate business interests may
justify limitations on consumer access to public accommodations.’ ” (Hankins v.
El Torito Restaurants, Inc. (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 510, 520 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d
684], internal citations omitted.)
• “Discrimination may be reasonable, and not arbitrary, in light of the nature of
the enterprise or its facilities, legitimate business interests (maintaining order,
complying with legal requirements, and protecting business reputation or
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investment), and public policy supporting the disparate treatment.” (Javorsky,
supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 1395.)
• “[T]he Act’s objective of prohibiting ‘unreasonable, arbitrary or invidious
discrimination’ is fulfilled by examining whether a price differential reflects an
‘arbitrary, class-based generalization.’ . . . [A] policy treating age groups
differently in this respect may be upheld, at least if the pricing policy (1)
ostensibly provides a social benefit to the recipient group; (2) the recipient
group is disadvantaged economically when compared to other groups paying
full price; and (3) there is no invidious discrimination.” (Javorsky, supra, 242
Cal.App.4th at p. 1399.)
• “Unruh Act issues have often been decided as questions of law on demurrer or
summary judgment when the policy or practice of a business establishment is
valid on its face because it bears a reasonable relation to commercial objectives
appropriate to an enterprise serving the public.” (Harris, supra, 52 Cal.3d at p.
1165, internal citations omitted.)
• “It is thus manifested by section 51 that all persons are entitled to the full and
equal privilege of associating with others in any business establishment. And
section 52, liberally interpreted, makes clear that discrimination by such a
business establishment against one’s right of association on account of the
associates’ color, is violative of the Act. It follows . . . that discrimination by a
business establishment against persons on account of their association with
others of the black race is actionable under the Act.” (Winchell v. English
(1976) 62 Cal.App.3d 125, 129 [133 Cal.Rptr. 20].)
• “Appellant is disabled as a matter of law not only because she is HIV positive,
but also because it is undisputed that respondent ‘regarded or treated’ her as a
person with a disability. The protection of the Unruh Civil Rights Act extends
both to people who are currently living with a physical disability that limits a
life activity and to those who are regarded by others as living with such a
disability. . . . ‘Both the policy and language of the statute offer protection to a
person who is not actually disabled, but is wrongly perceived to be. The
statute’s plain language leads to the conclusion that the “regarded as” definition
casts a broader net and protects any individual “regarded” or “treated” by an
employer “as having, or having had, any physical condition that makes
achievement of a major life activity difficult” or may do so in the future.’ Thus,
even an HIV-positive person who is outwardly asymptomatic is protected by the
Unruh Civil Rights Act.” (Maureen K. v. Tuschka (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 519,
529–530 [155 Cal.Rptr.3d 620], original italics, internal citations omitted.)
Secondary Sources
8 Witkin, Summary of California Law (10th ed. 2005) Constitutional Law,
§§ 898–914
Chin et al., California Practice Guide: Employment Litigation, Ch.7-G, Unruh Civil
Rights Act, ¶ 7:1525 et seq. (The Rutter Group)
11 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 116, Civil Rights: Discrimination
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in Business Establishments, §§ 116.10–116.13 (Matthew Bender)
3 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 35, Civil Rights: Unruh Civil Rights Act,
§ 35.20 et seq. (Matthew Bender)
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