CACI No. 3600. Conspiracy - Essential Factual Elements

Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 edition)

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3600.Conspiracy - Essential Factual Elements
[Name of plaintiff] claims that [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] was harmed by
[name of coconspirator]’s [insert tort theory] and that [name of defendant]
is responsible for the harm because [he/she/nonbinary pronoun] was part
of a conspiracy to commit [insert tort theory]. A conspiracy is an
agreement by two or more persons to commit a wrongful act. Such an
agreement may be made orally or in writing or may be implied by the
conduct of the parties.
If you find that [name of coconspirator] committed [a/an] [insert tort
theory] that harmed [name of plaintiff], then you must determine whether
[name of defendant] is also responsible for the harm. [Name of defendant]
is responsible if [name of plaintiff] proves both of the following:
1. That [name of defendant] was aware that [name of coconspirator]
[and others] planned to [insert wrongful act]; and
2. That [name of defendant] agreed with [name of coconspirator] [and
others] and intended that the [insert wrongful act] be committed.
Mere knowledge of a wrongful act without cooperation or an agreement
to cooperate is insufficient to make [name of defendant] responsible for
the harm.
A conspiracy may be inferred from circumstances, including the nature
of the acts done, the relationships between the parties, and the interests
of the alleged coconspirators. [Name of plaintiff] is not required to prove
that [name of defendant] personally committed a wrongful act or that [he/
she/nonbinary pronoun] knew all the details of the agreement or the
identities of all the other participants.
New September 2003
Sources and Authority
“Conspiracy is not a separate tort, but a form of vicarious liability by which one
defendant can be held liable for the acts of another. . . . A conspiracy requires
evidence ‘that each member of the conspiracy acted in concert and came to a
mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan, and that one
or more of them committed an overt act to further it.’ Thus, conspiracy provides
a remedial measure for affixing liability to all who have ‘agreed to a common
design to commit a wrong’ when damage to the plaintiff results. The defendant
in a conspiracy claim must be capable of committing the target tort.” (IIG
Wireless, Inc. v. Yi (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 630, 652 [231 Cal.Rptr.3d 771],
internal citations omitted.)
“Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability
on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with
the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration. By
participation in a civil conspiracy, a coconspirator effectively adopts as his or her
own the torts of other coconspirators within the ambit of the conspiracy. In this
way, a coconspirator incurs tort liability co-equal with the immediate
tortfeasors.” (Applied Equipment Corp. v. Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd. (1994) 7
Cal.4th 503, 510-511 [28 Cal.Rptr.2d 475, 869 P.2d 454], internal citations
“While criminal conspiracies involve distinct substantive wrongs, civil
conspiracies do not involve separate torts. The doctrine provides a remedial
measure for affixing liability to all persons who have ‘agreed to a common
design to commit a wrong.’ (Choate v. County of Orange (2000) 86
Cal.App.4th 312, 333 [103 Cal.Rptr.2d 339], internal citation omitted.)
“As long as two or more persons agree to perform a wrongful act, the law places
civil liability for the resulting damage on all of them, regardless of whether they
actually commit the tort themselves. ‘The effect of charging . . . conspiratorial
conduct is to implicate all . . . who agree to the plan to commit the wrong as
well as those who actually carry it out.’ (Wyatt v. Union Mortgage Co. (1979)
24 Cal.3d 773, 784 [157 Cal.Rptr. 392, 598 P.2d 45], internal citations omitted.)
“To support a conspiracy claim, a plaintiff must allege the following elements:
‘(1) the formation and operation of the conspiracy, (2) wrongful conduct in
furtherance of the conspiracy, and (3) damages arising from the wrongful
conduct.’ (AREI II Cases (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1022 [157 Cal.Rptr.3d
‘[T]he major significance of the conspiracy lies in the fact that it renders each
participant in the wrongful act responsible as a joint tortfeasor for all damages
ensuing from the wrong, irrespective of whether or not he was a direct actor and
regardless of the degree of his activity.’ (Applied Equipment Corp., supra, 7
Cal.4th at p. 511, internal citations omitted.)
“A complaint for civil conspiracy states a cause of action only when it alleges
the commission of a civil wrong that causes damage. Though conspiracy may
render additional parties liable for the wrong, the conspiracy itself is not
actionable without a wrong.” (Okun v. Superior Court (1981) 29 Cal.3d 442, 454
[175 Cal.Rptr. 157, 629 P.2d 1369].)
“Defendants seem to argue that an action for conspiracy must be based
exclusively on tort principles, not on a statutory violation that provides civil
penalties. No authority is cited for that proposition, and we cannot conceive of a
basis for limiting conspiracy claims in that manner. It is sufficient that a
conspiracy is based on an agreement to engage in unlawful conduct regardless of
whether the conspiracy violates a duty imposed by tort law or a statute.”
(Rickley v. Goodfriend (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1136, 1158 [151 Cal.Rptr.3d
“[Defendant] finally argues, relying on federal or out-of-state authorities, that
because [plaintiff] only alleged [driver] was negligent and the evidence does not
permit a finding that either she or [driver] intended to harm anyone, there is no
basis for liability; that there cannot be a civil conspiracy to commit a negligent
act. We acknowledge there is a split within out-of-state authorities, most of
which hold that parties cannot conspire to commit a negligent or unintentional
act and such a conspiracy is a legal impossibility. [¶] But the law in California
remains that a civil conspiracy requires an express or tacit agreement only to
commit a civil wrong or tort, which then renders all participants ‘responsible
. . . for all damages ensuing from the wrong . . . .’ (Navarrete v. Meyer
(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1276, 1293 [188 Cal.Rptr.3d 623], footnote omitted.)
“Because civil conspiracy is so easy to allege, plaintiffs have a weighty burden
to prove it. They must show that each member of the conspiracy acted in concert
and came to a mutual understanding to accomplish a common and unlawful plan,
and that one or more of them committed an overt act to further it. It is not
enough that the conspiring officers knew of an intended wrongful act, they had
to agree - expressly or tacitly - to achieve it. Unless there is such a meeting of
the minds, ‘the independent acts of two or more wrongdoers do not amount to a
conspiracy.’ (Choate, supra, 86 Cal.App.4th at p. 333, internal citations
“Conspiracies are typically proved by circumstantial evidence. ‘[S]ince such
participation, cooperation or unity of action is difficult to prove by direct
evidence, it can be inferred from the nature of the act done, the relation of the
parties, the interests of the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances.’
(Rickley, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1166, internal citation omitted.)
“A cause of action for civil conspiracy may not arise . . . if the alleged
conspirator, though a participant in the agreement underlying the injury, was not
personally bound by the duty violated by the wrongdoing . . . .” (Doctors’ Co. v.
Superior Court (1989) 49 Cal.3d 39, 44 [260 Cal.Rptr. 183, 775 P.2d 508],
internal citation omitted.)
“Conspiracy is not an independent tort; it cannot create a duty or abrogate an
immunity. It allows tort recovery only against a party who already owes the duty
and is not immune from liability based on applicable substantive tort law
principles.” (Applied Equipment Corp., supra, 7 Cal.4th at p. 514, internal
citations omitted.)
“A conspiracy cannot be alleged as a tort separate from the underlying wrong it
is organized to achieve. As long as the underlying wrongs are subject to
privilege, defendants cannot be held liable for a conspiracy to commit those
wrongs. Acting in concert with others does not destroy the immunity of
defendants.” (McMartin v. Children’s Institute International (1989) 212
Cal.App.3d 1393, 1406 [261 Cal.Rptr. 437], internal citations omitted.)
“We agree . . . that the general rule is that a party who is not personally bound
by the duty violated may not be held liable for civil conspiracy even though it
may have participated in the agreement underlying the injury. However, an
exception to this rule exists when the participant acts in furtherance of its own
financial gain.” (Mosier v. Southern California Physicians Insurance Exchange
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1022, 1048 [74 Cal.Rptr.2d 550], internal citations
‘The basis of a civil conspiracy is the formation of a group of two or more
persons who have agreed to a common plan or design to commit a tortious act.’
The conspiring defendants must also have actual knowledge that a tort is
planned and concur in the tortious scheme with knowledge of its unlawful
purpose.” (Kidron v. Movie Acquisition Corp. (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1571, 1582
[47 Cal.Rptr.2d 752], internal citations omitted.)
“Liability as a co-conspirator depends upon projected joint action. ‘The mere
knowledge, acquiescence, or approval of the act, without co-operation or
agreement to cooperate is not enough . . . .’ But once the plan for joint action is
shown, ‘a defendant may be held liable who in fact committed no overt act and
gained no benefit therefrom.’ (Wetherton v. Growers Farm Labor Assn. (1969)
275 Cal.App.2d 168, 176 [79 Cal.Rptr. 543], internal citations omitted,
disapproved on another ground in Applied Equipment Corp., supra, 7 Cal.4th at
p. 521, fn. 10.)
“Furthermore, the requisite concurrence and knowledge ‘may be inferred from
the nature of the acts done, the relation of the parties, the interests of the alleged
conspirators, and other circumstances.’ Tacit consent as well as express approval
will suffice to hold a person liable as a coconspirator.” (Wyatt, supra, 24 Cal.3d
at p. 785, internal citations omitted.)
“[A]ctual knowledge of the planned tort, without more, is insufficient to serve as
the basis for a conspiracy claim. Knowledge of the planned tort must be
combined with intent to aid in its commission. ‘The sine qua non of a
conspiratorial agreement is the knowledge on the part of the alleged conspirators
of its unlawful objective and their intent to aid in achieving that objective.’ ‘This
rule derives from the principle that a person is generally under no duty to take
affirmative action to aid or protect others.’ (Kidron, supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p.
1582, internal citations omitted.)
“While knowledge and intent ‘may be inferred from the nature of the acts done,
the relation of the parties, the interest of the alleged conspirators, and other
circumstances,’ ‘[c]onspiracies cannot be established by suspicions. There must
be some evidence. Mere association does not make a conspiracy. There must be
evidence of some participation or interest in the commission of the offense.’ An
inference must flow logically from other facts established in the action.” (Kidron,
supra, 40 Cal.App.4th at p. 1583, internal citations omitted.)
“[A] nonfiduciary cannot conspire to breach a duty owed only by a fiduciary.”
(American Master Lease LLC v. Idanta Partners, Ltd. (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th
1451, 1474 [171 Cal.Rptr.3d 548].)
Secondary Sources
5 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Torts, § 151 et seq.
Croskey et al., California Practice Guide: Insurance Litigation, Ch. 11-I, Conspiracy,
11:167 et seq. (The Rutter Group)
1 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 9, Civil Conspiracy, Concerted Action, and
Related Theories of Joint Liability, § 9.03 (Matthew Bender)
13 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 126, Conspiracy, § 126.11
(Matthew Bender)
4 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 46, Conspiracy, § 46.20 et seq. (Matthew

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