California Civil Jury Instructions (CACI)
611. Affirmative Defense—Statute of Limitations—Attorney Malpractice—Four-Year Limit (Code Civ. Proc., § 340.6)
[Name of defendant] contends that [name of plaintiff]’s lawsuit was not filed within the time set by law. To succeed on this defense, [name of defendant] must prove that [his/her/its] alleged wrongful act or omission occurred before [insert date four years before date of filing].
[If, however, [name of plaintiff] proves
[Choose one or more of the following four options:]
[that [he/she/it] did not sustain actual injury until on or after [insert date four years before date of filing]][,/; or]]
[that on or after [insert date four years before date of filing] [name of defendant] continued to represent [name of plaintiff] regarding the specific subject matter in which the wrongful act or omission occurred[,/; or]]
[that on or after [insert date four years before date of filing] [name of defendant] knowingly concealed the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission[,/; or]]
[that on or after [insert date four years before date of filing] [he/she/it] was under a legal or physical disability that restricted [his/her/its] ability to file a lawsuit[,/;]]
the period within which [name of plaintiff] had to file the lawsuit is extended for the amount of time that [insert tolling provision, e.g., [name of defendant] knowingly concealed the facts].]
New April 2007; Revised April 2009
Directions for Use
Use CACI No. 610, Affırmative Defense—Statute of Limitations—Attorney Malpractice—One-Year Limit, if the one-year limitation provision is at issue.
If no tolling provision from Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 is at issue, read only through the end of the first paragraph. Read the rest of the instruction if there is a question of fact concerning a tolling provision. If so, the verdict form should ask the jury to find (1) the date on which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred; (2) whether the tolling provision applies; and (3) if so, for what period of time. The court can then add the additional time to the date on which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred and determine whether the action is timely.
The court may need to define the term “actual injury” depending on the facts and circumstances of the particular case.
Sources and Authority
- Code of Civil Procedure section 340.6 provides:
(a) An action against an attorney for a wrongful act or omission, other than for actual fraud, arising in the performance of professional services shall be commenced within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first. If the plaintiff is required to establish his or her factual innocence for an underlying criminal charge as an element of his or her claim, the action shall be commenced within two years after the plaintiff achieves postconviction exoneration in the form of a final judicial disposition of the criminal case. Except for a claim for which the plaintiff is required to establish his or her factual innocence, in no event shall the time for commencement of legal action exceed four years except that the period shall be tolled during the time that any of the following exist:
(1) The plaintiff has not sustained actual injury;
(2) The attorney continues to represent the plaintiff regarding the specific subject matter in which the alleged wrongful act or omission occurred;
(3) The attorney willfully conceals the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission when such facts are known to the attorney, except that this subdivision shall toll only the four- year limitation; and
(4) The plaintiff is under a legal or physical disability which restricts the plaintiff’s ability to commence legal action.
(b) In an action based upon an instrument in writing, the effective date of which depends upon some act or event of the future, the period of limitations provided for by this section shall commence to run upon the occurrence of that act or event.
- Code of Civil Procedure section 352 provides:
(a) If a person entitled to bring an action, mentioned in Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 335) is, at the time the cause of action accrued either under the age of majority or insane, the time of the disability is not part of the time limited for the commencement of the action.
(b) This section does not apply to an action against a public entity or public employee upon a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented in accordance with Chapter 1 (commencing with Section 900) or Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 910) of Part 3, or Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 950) of Part 4, of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code. This subdivision shall not apply to any claim presented to a public entity prior to January 1, 1971.
- “Under section 340.6, the one-year limitations period commences when the plaintiff actually or constructively discovers the facts of the wrongful act or omission, but the period is tolled until the plaintiff sustains actual injury. That is to say, the statute of limitations will not run during the time the plaintiff cannot bring a cause of action for damages from professional negligence.” (Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Brobeck, Phleger & Harrison (1998) 18 Cal.4th 739, 751 [76 Cal.Rptr.2d 749, 958 P.2d 1062].)
- “Actual injury refers only to the legally cognizable damage necessary to assert the cause of action. There is no requirement that an adjudication or settlement must first confirm a causal nexus between the attorney’s error and the asserted injury. The determination of actual injury requires only a factual analysis of the claimed error and its consequences. The inquiry necessarily is more qualitative than quantitative because the fact of damage, rather than the amount, is the critical factor.” (Truong v. Glasser (2009) 181 Cal.App.4th 102, 113 [103 Cal.Rptr.3d 811].)
- “ ‘[S]ection 340.6, subdivision (a)(1), will not toll the limitations period once the client can plead damages that could establish a cause of action for legal malpractice.’ ‘[T]he limitations period is not tolled after the plaintiff sustains actual injury [even] if the injury is, in some sense, remediable. [Citation.] Furthermore, the statutory scheme does not depend on the plaintiff’s recognizing actual injury. Actual injury must be noticeable, but the language of the tolling provision does not require that it be noticed.’ On the other hand, ‘the statute of limitations will not run during the time the plaintiff cannot bring a cause of action for damages from professional negligence’ because the plaintiff cannot allege actual injury resulted from an attorney’s malpractice.” (Croucier v. Chavos (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1148 [144 Cal.Rptr.3d 180], internal citations omitted.)
- “[B]ecause ‘determining actual injury is predominately a factual inquiry’ to the extent a question remains on this point, the matter is properly resolved by the trier of fact . . . .” (Callahan v. Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 557, 576 [125 Cal.Rptr.3d 120].)
- “[P]rior to the enactment of section 340.6 the running of the statute of limitations coincided with accrual of the plaintiff’s malpractice cause of action, including damages. By contrast, under the provisions of section 340.6, discovery of the negligent act or omission initiates the statutory period, and the absence of injury or damages serves as a tolling factor.” (Adams v. Paul (1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 598 fn. 2 [46 Cal.Rptr.2d 594, 904 P.2d 1205], internal citations omitted.)
- “[A] defendant must prove the facts necessary to enjoy the benefit of a statute of limitations.” (Samuels v. Mix (1999) 22 Cal.4th 1, 10 [91 Cal.Rptr.2d 273, 989 P.2d 701], internal citations omitted.)
- “In ordinary tort and contract actions, the statute of limitations, it is true, begins to run upon the occurrence of the last element essential to the cause of action. The plaintiff’s ignorance of the cause of action, or of the identity of the wrongdoer, does not toll the statute. In cases of professional malpractice, however, postponement of the period of limitations until discovery finds justification in the special nature of the relationship between the professional man and his client.” (Neel v. Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 187–188 [98 Cal.Rptr. 837, 491 P.2d 421], footnote omitted.)
- “If the allegedly negligent conduct does not cause damage, it generates no cause of action in tort. The mere breach of a professional duty, causing only nominal damages, speculative harm, or the threat of future harm—not yet realized—does not suffice to create a cause of action for negligence. Hence, until the client suffers appreciable harm as a consequence of his attorney’s negligence, the client cannot establish a cause of action for malpractice.” (Budd v. Nixen (1971) 6 Cal.3d 195, 200 [98 Cal.Rptr. 849, 491 P.2d 433], internal citations omitted.)
- “The mere existence of an attorney-client relationship does not trigger the continuous representation rule: ‘Instead, the statute’s tolling language addresses a particular phase of such a relationship-representation regarding a specific subject matter. Moreover, the limitations period is not tolled when an attorney’s subsequent role is only tangentially related to the legal representation the attorney provided to the plaintiff. Therefore, “[t]he inquiry is not whether an attorney-client relationship still exists but when the representation of the specific matter terminated.” ’ Tolling does not apply where there is a continuing relationship between the attorney and client ‘involving only unrelated matters.’ ” (Lockton v. O’Rourke (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1051, 1064 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 392], original italics, internal citations omitted.)
- “[W]here a client hires a law firm to represent it, the provisions of section 340.6 apply to that firm; the term ‘attorney’ in section 340.6 may embrace the entire partnership, law corporation, or other legal entity the client retains. [¶] That either an attorney or a firm may be the subject of an action does not support a reading under which representation by one attorney or firm might toll the limitations period as to another no longer affiliated attorney or firm. Rather, the text implies an action against a law firm is tolled so long as that firm continues representation, just as an action against an attorney is tolled so long as that attorney continues representation, but representation by one attorney or firm does not toll claims that may exist against a different, unaffiliated attorney or firm.” (Beal Bank, SSB v. Arter & Hadden, LLP (2007) 42 Cal.4th 503, 509 [66 Cal.Rptr.3d 52, 167 P.3d 666], original italics.)
- “ ‘Ordinarily, an attorney’s representation is not completed until the agreed tasks or events have occurred, the client consents to termination or a court grants an application by counsel for withdrawal.’ ‘The rule is that, for purposes of the statute of limitations, the attorney’s representation is concluded when the parties so agree, and that result does not depend upon formal termination, such as withdrawing as counsel of record.’ ‘Continuity of representation ultimately depends, not on the client’s subjective beliefs, but rather on evidence of an ongoing mutual relationship and of activities in furtherance of the relationship.’ ” (Nielsen v. Beck (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1049 [69 Cal.Rptr.3d 435], internal citations omitted.)
- “[A]bsent a statutory standard to determine when an attorney’s representation of a client regarding a specific subject matter ends, and consistent with the purposes of the continuing representation rule, we conclude that for purposes of . . . section 340.6, subdivision (a)(2), in the event of an attorney’s unilateral withdrawal or abandonment of the client, the representation ends when the client actually has or reasonably should have no expectation that the attorney will provide further legal services. . . . That may occur upon the attorney’s express notification to the client that the attorney will perform no further services, or, if the attorney remains silent, may be inferred from the circumstances. Absent actual notice to the client that the attorney will perform no further legal services or circumstances that reasonably should cause the client to so conclude, a client should be entitled to rely on an attorney to perform the agreed services and should not be required to interrupt the attorney- client relationship by filing a malpractice complaint. After a client has no reasonable expectation that the attorney will provide further legal services, however, the client is no longer hindered by a potential disruption of the attorney-client relationship and no longer relies on the attorney’s continuing representation, so the tolling should end. To this extent and for these reasons, we conclude that continuous representation should be viewed objectively from the client’s perspective . . . .” (Laclette v. Galindo (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 919, 928 [109 Cal.Rptr.3d 660], original italics.)
3 Witkin, California Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Actions, §§ 573, 626–655
3 Levy et al., California Torts, Ch. 32, Liability of Attorneys, § 32.60 (Matthew Bender)
1 Matthew Bender Practice Guide: California Pretrial Civil Procedure, Ch. 4, Limitation of Actions, 4.05
7 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 76, Attorney Professional Liability, §§ 76.170, 76.430 (Matthew Bender)
33 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 380, Negligence, § 380.150 (Matthew Bender)