CACI No. 3043. Violation of Prisoner’s Federal Civil Rights - Eighth Amendment - Deprivation of Necessities (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instructions (2024 edition)
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3043.Violation of Prisoner’s Federal Civil Rights - Eighth
Amendment - Deprivation of Necessities (42 U.S.C. § 1983)
[Name of plaintiff] claims that [name of defendant] subjected
[him/her/nonbinary pronoun] to prison conditions that deprived [him/her/
nonbinary pronoun] of basic rights. To establish this claim, [name of
plaintiff] must prove all of the following:
1. That [name of plaintiff] was imprisoned under conditions that
deprived [him/her/nonbinary pronoun] of [describe deprivation, e.g.,
clothing];
2. That this deprivation was sufficiently serious in that it denied
[name of plaintiff] a minimal necessity of life;
3. That [name of defendant]’s conduct created a substantial risk of
serious harm to [name of plaintiff]’s health or safety;
4. That [name of defendant] knew that [his/her/nonbinary pronoun]
conduct created a substantial risk of serious harm to [name of
plaintiff]’s health or safety;
5. That there was no reasonable justification for the deprivation;
6. That [name of defendant] was acting or purporting to act in the
performance of [his/her/nonbinary pronoun] official duties;
7. That [name of plaintiff] was harmed; and
8. That [name of defendant]’s conduct was a substantial factor in
causing [name of plaintiff]’s harm.
Whether the risk was obvious is a factor that you may consider in
determining whether [name of defendant] knew of the risk.
New June 2015; Revised May 2020
Directions for Use
Give this instruction in a prisoner case involving deprivation of something serious.
(See Thomas v. Ponder (9th Cir. 2010) 611 F.3d 1144, 1150-1151.) For an
instruction involving the creation of a risk, see CACI No. 3040, Violation of
Prisoner’s Federal Civil Rights - Eighth Amendment - Substantial Risk of Serious
Harm. For an instruction on deprivation of medical care, see CACI No. 3041,
Violation of Prisoner’s Federal Civil Rights - Eighth Amendment - Medical Care.
In prison-conditions cases, the inmate must show that the defendant was deliberately
indifferent to the inmate’s health or safety. (Farmer v. Brennan (1994) 511 U.S. 825,
834 [114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811].) “Deliberate indifference” involves a two-
part inquiry. First, the inmate must show that the prison officials were aware of a
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substantial risk of serious harm to the inmate’s health or safety. Second, the inmate
must show that the prison officials had no reasonable justification for the conduct, in
spite of that risk. (Thomas,supra, 611 F.3d at p. 1150.) Elements 4 and 5 express
the deliberate-indifference components.
The “official duties” referred to in element 6 must be duties created by any state,
county, or municipal law, ordinance, or regulation. This aspect of color of law most
likely will not be an issue for the jury, so it has been omitted to shorten the wording
of element 6.
Sources and Authority
• Civil Action for Deprivation of Rights. Title 42 United States Code section 1983.
• “It is undisputed that the treatment a prisoner receives in prison and the
conditions under which he is confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth
Amendment.” (Helling v. McKinney (1993) 509 U.S. 25, 31 [113 S.Ct. 2475, 125
L.Ed.2d 22].)
• “Prison officials have a duty to ensure that prisoners are provided adequate
shelter, food, clothing, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety.” (Johnson v.
Lewis (9th Cir. 2000) 217 F.3d 726, 731, internal citations omitted.)
• “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement
claim. Because routine discomfort is ‘part of the penalty that criminal offenders
pay for their offenses against society,’ ‘only those deprivations denying “the
minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities” are sufficiently grave to form the
basis of an Eighth Amendment violation.’ ” (Hudson v. McMillian (1992) 503
U.S. 1, 9 [112 S.Ct. 995, 117 L.Ed.2d 156], internal citations omitted.)
• “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements
are met. First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious,’
a prison official’s act or omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal
civilized measure of life’s necessities,’ . . . .” (Farmer, supra, 511 U.S. at p.
834, internal citations omitted.)
• “ ‘[O]nly the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain implicates the Eighth
Amendment.’ To violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, a prison
official must have a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.’ In prison-conditions
cases that state of mind is one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or
safety . . . .” (Farmer,supra, 511 U.S. at p. 834, internal citations omitted.)
• “[A]n inmate seeking to prove an Eighth Amendment violation must ‘objectively
show that he was deprived of something “sufficiently serious,” ’ and ‘make a
subjective showing that the deprivation occurred with deliberate indifference to
the inmate’s health or safety.’ The second step, showing ‘deliberate indifference,’
involves a two part inquiry. First, the inmate must show that the prison officials
were aware of a ‘substantial risk of serious harm’ to an inmate’s health or safety.
This part of our inquiry may be satisfied if the inmate shows that the risk posed
by the deprivation is obvious. Second, the inmate must show that the prison
officials had no ‘reasonable’ justification for the deprivation, in spite of that
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risk.” (Thomas,supra, 611 F.3d at p. 1150, footnote and internal citations
omitted.)
• “Next, the inmate must ‘make a subjective showing that the deprivation occurred
with deliberate indifference to the inmate’s health or safety.’ To satisfy this
subjective component of deliberate indifference, the inmate must show that
prison officials ‘kn[e]w[] of and disregard[ed]’ the substantial risk of harm, but
the officials need not have intended any harm to befall the inmate; ‘it is enough
that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk
of serious harm.’ ” (Lemire v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab. (9th Cir. 2013) 726
F.3d 1062, 1074, internal citations omitted.)
• “Whether a prison official had the requisite knowledge of a substantial risk is a
question of fact subject to demonstration in the usual ways, including inference
from circumstantial evidence, and a factfinder may conclude that a prison official
knew of a substantial risk from the very fact that the risk was obvious.”
(Farmer,supra, 511 U.S. at p. 842, internal citation omitted.)
• “When instructing juries in deliberate indifference cases with such issues of
proof, courts should be careful to ensure that the requirement of subjective
culpability is not lost. It is not enough merely to find that a reasonable person
would have known, or that the defendant should have known, and juries should
be instructed accordingly.” (Farmer,supra, 511 U.S. at p. 843 fn. 8.)
• “The precise role of legitimate penological interests is not entirely clear in the
context of an Eighth Amendment challenge to conditions of confinement. The
Supreme Court has written that the test of Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107
S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (1987), which requires only a reasonable relationship
to a legitimate penological interest to justify prison regulations, does not apply to
Eighth Amendment claims. The existence of a legitimate penological justification
has, however, been used in considering whether adverse treatment is sufficiently
gratuitous to constitute punishment for Eighth Amendment purposes.” (Grenning
v. Miller-Stout (9th Cir. 2014) 739 F.3d 1235, 1240.)
• “We recognize that prison officials have a ‘better grasp’ of the policies required
to operate a correctional facility than either judges or juries. For this reason, in
. . . conditions of confinement cases, we instruct juries to defer to prison
officials’ judgments in adopting and executing policies needed to preserve
discipline and maintain security.” (Mendiola-Martinez v. Arpaio (9th Cir. 2016)
836 F.3d 1239, 1254, internal citation omitted.)
• “However, our precedent should not be misread to suggest that jail officials are
automatically entitled to deference instructions in conditions of confinement or
excessive force cases brought by prisoners, or § 1983 actions brought by former
inmates. We have long recognized that a jury need not defer to prison officials
where the plaintiff produces substantial evidence showing that the jail’s policy or
practice is an unnecessary, unjustified, or exaggerated response to the need for
prison security.” (Shorter v. Baca (9th Cir. 2018) 895 F.3d 1176, 1183, internal
citations omitted.)
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• “Although claims by pretrial detainees arise under the Fourteenth Amendment
and claims by convicted prisoners arise under the Eighth Amendment, our cases
do not distinguish among pretrial and postconviction detainees for purposes of
the excessive force, conditions of confinement, and medical care deference
instructions.” (Shorter, supra, 895 F.3d at p. 1182, fn. 4.)
Secondary Sources
8 Witkin, Summary of California Law (11th ed. 2017) Constitutional Law, § 888
3 Civil Rights Actions, Ch. 11, Deprivation of Rights Under Color of State
Law - Prisons, ¶ 11.02 (Matthew Bender)
11 California Forms of Pleading and Practice, Ch. 113, Civil Rights: The Post-Civil
War Civil Rights Statutes, § 113.14 (Matthew Bender)
18 California Points and Authorities, Ch. 196, Public Entities, § 196.183 (Matthew
Bender)
3044-3045. Reserved for Future Use
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© Judicial Council of California.
